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REDEFINING STEWARDSHIP OVER BODY PARTS
ELIZABETH E. APPEL BLUE*
“And the question will then arise whether we are still willing to use the concept . . . or
whether in such circumstances it has lost its purpose, because the phenomena gravitate
towards another paradigm . . . .”

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (3d ed. 1958) (translated by
G.E.M. Anscombe), at ¶ 385 (p.118e).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s society struggles with organ shortages.1 Exacerbating the problem is the
absence of a universally accepted paradigm for how justly to treat body parts, such as
*
B.A. 1990, Yale College; J.D. 1994, Yale Law School; M.A., Bioethics, 2007, University
of Virginia. Many thanks to Robert Blue, Andrea Bjorklund, and William Murray for their
invaluable editorial assistance on earlier versions of this article, and thanks to my family for
their love, patience, and support. Thanks also to James Childress for his suggestions regarding
research and comments on an early outline.
1

The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), for example, reported a waiting list of
92,587 as of August 15, 2006, with a total of 12,002 transplants from January to May of 2006
and 6122 donors in that same period. See http://www.unos.org. These numbers are “dynamic
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organs and tissue. Scholarly tomes are filled with articles addressing this subject.
Yet confusion still reigns. Limited framing of the question that requires acceptance
of either a property/market paradigm or altruistic donor paradigm has failed to lead
to a solution, as neither the property nor altruistic solutions are universally accepted.
Further, many compromise solutions also fall short as they are either impractical
legislative solutions with no realistic chance of implementation or small, piecemeal,
too little, too late experiments. Similarly, the case law addressing body parts imparts
a sense of disorder and bewilderment. The law is at a loss as to how to address body
parts consistently. This failure to reach a generally acceptable solution to the
treatment of body parts can be seen as a “failure of [our] imagination.”2
This paper proposes one possible avenue for defining a framework to address
body parts. I begin with the presumption that given the increasing use of body parts
outside of our bodies, either after death or during life, society requires a framework
with institutions and rules to govern our body parts. Yet there is no settled
framework. Much of the controversy over differing approaches stems from whether
people should be able to sell body parts. Thus, each potential framework implicitly
addresses the question of monetary value. While multiple possibilities exist, the
predominant models are (1) property, most often meaning ownership that permits
monetary compensation; (2) stewardship, implying altruism and no monetary
compensation to the donor; and (3) a compromise solution involving regulatory
bodies, which could assign monetary value under certain circumstances.
Each approach suffers from multiple shortcomings. Yet each has its strengths.
For example, the need for rules drives, in part, the attraction to a market and property
paradigm, with its long-standing and familiar institutions and rules.3 Yet property is
not an exact match, and significant long-term problems regarding how we conceive
of ourselves may develop if our legal conceptions of property are mapped directly
onto our bodies. Stewardship is a competing concept often relied upon, but it lacks
the institutions and rules that the property concept provides. As a vague and
amorphous ethical concept, stewardship is poorly suited to be a consistent guide in
and change[] throughout the year.” INST. OF MEDICINE, ORGAN DONATION, 1, 46 (James F.
Childress & Catharyn T. Liverman, eds., 2006) [hereinafter ORGAN DONATION]. While some
candidates may have multiple registrations, regardless of how numbers are tallied, plainly, in
economic terms, organ supply falls far short of demand, and each year many individuals die
waiting for a transplant. Id. at 1-2, 45-46. The vast majority of these individuals–more than
70 percent–are in need of kidneys. Id. at 2, 46.
2
Salman Rushdie used this phrase in discussing the Islamic and Judeo-Christian word’s
understandings of each other in an interview with Bill Moyers in Public Broadcasting’s
Reason and Faith series. Interview by Bill Moyers with Salman Rushdie (June 23, 2006)
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/faithandreason/print/faithandreason101_
print.html). See also DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 17 (1991) (explaining
how “paradoxes that beset traditional philosophical debates about . . . the nature of the self or
ego and its relation to thoughts and sensations . . . arise from failures of the imagination”)
(italics in original).
3

And, as discussed, infra in Sections III.A and IV, we also use our bodies, in part, as a way
of defining both our privacy and property rights in relationship to others and to the state. See
Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 365 n.15 (2000).
For that reason, there is a natural inclination to associate them as “ours.” And, in some sense,
they are more ours than any other object in the world. The dilemma is that they are more than
an object that belongs to us–they also constitute our subjectivity.
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the evolving reality of a marketplace of human tissue and other body parts.4 Markets
and other distribution systems require consistent off-the-rack rules, as well as ethics.
This paper, therefore, seeks to look creatively at other bodies of law to see if they
can be reimagined and used to give stewardship some backbone, meaning concrete
principles that can be applied to the use of body parts. In doing so, it seeks to
provide a place for compensation and incentives which property provides but avoid
some of the pitfalls of property by preserving the special place that the body has in
defining ourselves and our humanity. It seeks to do this by using, as a starting point,
one of the law’s older bodies of law, agency law. While, like so many other
concepts, there is not an exact match with this concept either, there is the potential to
take agency law as a starting point and fashion certain principles into a better fit than
either property or undefined stewardship.
The first step in the process is to review today’s treatment of body parts. Thus,
the second section of this paper looks at the markets surrounding the use of body
parts. Next it reviews a variety of approaches taken to body parts to discern what is
appealing and what is lacking in each approach. Then, after reviewing existing law
and literature, this paper asks what a paradigm addressing body parts must
accomplish. Finally, it begins to outline how certain aspects of agency law could be
relied upon and modified to meet the challenges facing any governing framework.
II. BODY PARTS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
“In recent history, we have seen the human body assume astonishing
aspects of [commercial] value.”5
Within the past several decades, modern medicine and bio-technology have
revolutionized the uses of the human body. Notwithstanding efforts to protect the
body and its parts as a sacrosanct realm, markets have evolved in tissue, organs, and
other body parts, as these “human” parts constitute the raw material in multiple
industries. The tissue industry over the course of a decade, for example, has evolved
from approximately a $20 million dollar industry in the early 1990s to a billion
dollar industry in 2003.6 And the raw component for this industry is the human
body, which continues to increase in market value. On average a cadaver generates
between $30,000 to $50,000 in value, but a single cadaver can generate over
$200,000.7

4

Indeed, “stewardship” as a word and concept does not even have its own entry in any
dictionary I could find. See infra note 237 (discussing dictionaries’ treatment of stewardship).
5
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988),
rev’d, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
6

TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE: ETHICS, POLICY AND PRACTICE xi (Stuart J. Younger, et
al., eds., 2004); see also Michele Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ
Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 387 n. 406 (2004).
7
Younger, et al. supra note 6, at 13. See also Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits, supra note 6, at
387 n.407 (2004) (citing Investigating Regeneration Technologies Report). Tissue-based
products used in spinal surgery, for example, generated approximately 300 million in revenues
to tissue banks in 2001. Martha W. Anderson & Scott Bottenfield, Tissue Banking–Past,
Present, and Future, in YOUNGER, ET AL. supra note 6, at 17.
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There are thriving markets, both licit and illicit, in the United States and abroad.8
Regulation of these markets varies, running the spectrum from extensive to
nonexistent.9
Complicating the industry’s ethics is the unfortunate fact that the source of much
of its raw material for commercial transactions is derived from body parts often
donated by individuals or their families with altruistic motives.10 As the Inspector
General of Health and Human Resources noted, these altruistic feelings conflict with
the reality that their donations are the backbone of large-scale commercialized and
often profit-driven or, at a minimum, bottom line driven industries.11 In the tissue
industry, for example, donated skin becomes a commodity and is often applied to
cosmetic higher dollar value products instead of what might have been envisioned by
the donor as the most need driven purpose of, for example, aiding a burn victim.12
Moreover, financial incentives have led to many abuses of the system.13 Multiple
scandals have surfaced in which non-consenting donor tissue has been used to
generate profits.14 In 1997, for example, the Los Angeles Times uncovered evidence
that the Los Angeles coroner was illegally trafficking in body parts by selling
corneas without consent for $335 per pair, which were then resold at $3400 per pair
by a tissue transplant bank.15 In 2004, the David Geffen School of Medicine at
UCLA found itself in the middle of a scandal in which cadavers donated by families
for medical purposes (e.g., anatomy class) were being sawed into pieces and sold on

8

For example, while, as discussed below, the sale of organs is illegal in the United States,
foreign organ sales occur on a black market. See, e.g., ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 274
(describing study of 305 individuals in Chennai, India who sold their kidneys–the vast
majority doing so in order to pay off debt); Goodwin, supra note 6, at 309; Craig S. Smith,
Quandary in U.S. Over Use of Organs of Chinese Inmates, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001
(describing anecdotal evidence of increasing numbers of Americans receiving transplants in
China with organs from executed Chinese prisoners and then returning to the United States for
follow-up care).
9
The Food and Drug Administration, for example, has only recently started registration
and inspection requirements for tissue banks. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 386.
10

Younger, et al., supra note 6, at 85-98. Eighty-five percent of tissue retrieved today,
especially bone, is processed into paste, powder, chips, and many additional configurations for
use that the public does not traditionally associate with transplant and donor products. Jeffrey
Prottas, Ethics of Allocation, Lessons from Organ Procurement History, 120-138 in
TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 6.
11

Even non-profit entities have bottom lines that must be met.

12

Goodwin, supra note 6, at 382 n.381.While many uses of tissue are legitimate and may
be foreseen, the fact that cadaver skin is used to “enhance penis size, puff up lips, or erase
laugh lines” and that “[p]lastic surgeons have not reported trouble obtaining skin for plastic
surgery, but burn centers across the country are struggling to find skin to treat burn victims,”
may not be envisioned by most donors. Id.
13

See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.

14

Id.

15

Michelle Goodwin, Op-Ed., Commerce in Cadavers Open Secret, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
March 11, 2004.
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the open market.16 As many as 800 cadavers donated to the institution for medical
research had been transferred to private companies for use in the medical parts and
device industry in exchange for monetary fees.17 There is no shortage of similar
scandals. For example, just last year, a New York dentist, two of his workers, and an
embalmer were charged with having illegally taken and traded $4.6 million worth of
body parts from corpses in funeral homes.18 Local prosecutors alleged that these
four men had illegally sold human tissue taken from more than 1,000 cadavers at
various funeral homes where consent had been forged on papers by the owners of the
home without the next of kin’s knowledge or consent.19
Use of cadaveric tissue is not the only industry arising out of human body parts.
Private sales of eggs for tens of thousands of dollars have been reported.20 Sperm is
regularly purchased and sold by fertility clinics.21 In Texas, a company now offers
for sale fertilized eggs that potential parents can select after reviewing the college
board scores, race, and genetic background of the egg and sperm donors.22 Yet,
despite the reproductive industry’s growth, there is virtually no regulation of fertility
clinics and their use of reproductive body parts.
Similarly, research participants or patients undergoing surgery are treated as
donors (with no remuneration) when their tissue or other parts are extracted during
medical treatment.23 Those body parts may then be used for biomedical research and
product development.24 In the most famous case to date, John Moore filed suit after
discovering that his doctor had developed and patented an extremely profitable cell
16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Robyn S. Shapiro, Mining the Human Body: Biotech advances demand new laws
regulating the trade in cadavers, LEGAL TIMES, May 17, 2004.
19
Michael Brick, 4 Men Charged in What Officials Call a $4.6 Million Trade in Human
Body Parts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006. Perhaps even more disturbing than the lack of
consent is the fact that “no medical precautions were taken to ensure that these transplants
were free from disease,” and these men often lowered the age of the deceased and altered the
cause of death “to make the tissue appear more promising for transplant or therapy.” Id.

Such scandals are by no means new. England and the United States faced similar scandals
in the Nineteenth Century when a market for cadavers for anatomy lab developed. Two
Scotsmen, William Burke and William Hare even went so far as to commit murder (not just
disinter the recently buried) in order to provide fresh bodies to anatomists and universities.
RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 9-10 (1981); Shapiro, supra note 18.
20
Goodwin, supra note 6, at 390-91 (describing the purchase of eggs in the United States
from a website selling model eggs for as much as $50,000 and United Kingdom egg sales)..
21

Id.

22

Rob Stein, ‘Embryo Bank’ Stirs Ethics Fears: Firm Lets Clients Pick Among Fertilized
Eggs, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 6, 2007, at A1.
23

Donna Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of
Human Research Participant’s Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 W. & L. L.
REV. 257, 270 (2004). See also LORI ANDREWS AND DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BIZARRE: THE
MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE 24-41 (2001).
24

Id.
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line initially named after him as the Mo-cell line,25 which had a market potential to
generate up to $3 billion in proceeds by 1990.26 His cells had been taken and used
for research without his knowledge or consent during his treatment for hairy cell
leukemia at the University of California, Los Angeles Medical Center. When Moore
sued alleging an ownership right in his body parts, a strongly divided California
Supreme Court sided with the emerging biotech industry and awarded him no legal
ownership interest in his body parts.27
Organs represent one of the most highly regulated of the fields using body parts
and one of the more publicly visible uses of body parts.28 The first successful organ
transplantation between living brothers took place in 1954 and the first from a
deceased donor took place in 1962.29 Organ transplantation over the last fifty years
has prolonged thousands of lives. As of the spring of 2006, medical teams had
transplanted over 390,000 organs since 1988.30 During 2005, 7593 deceased donors
“provided 23,249 transplanted organs in the United States alone, and there were
6,896 living donors.”31 The waiting list, however, continues to grow, and the
difference between supply and demand keeps widening as a result.32 In 2005 alone,
for example, 44,619 candidates were added to the kidney transplant waiting list.33
Many individuals die each year while waiting for a transplant. These deaths, which

25

Defendants later renamed the cell line to avoid detection by John Moore. Moore, 249
Cal. Rptr. at 500; see also Gitter, supra note 23, at n. 63.
26

Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498; see also Gitter, supra note 23, at n. 274.

27

Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); see also discussion of
Moore in ANDREWS & NELKIN, BODY BIZARRE, supra note 23, at 27-36, and discussion in
Rao, supra note 3. More recently, the National Research Council (“NRC”) in 2005 issued
Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research which recommend that researchers
make no payment “in cash or in kind, to any person who donates tissue for stem cell research,
including eggs, sperm, adult cells, or frozen early-stage embryos stored at in vitro fertilization
clinics.” Russell Korobkin, Buying and Selling Human Tissues for Stem Cell Research, 49
ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 45 (2007).
28

Blood, through its use in transfusions, is obviously far more common and, therefore,
more visible. Despite some controversy over paying for blood, the systems for blood donation
and disbursement through the Red Cross and other blood banks are fairly well established and
uncontroversial at this moment in time—with most blood donated today; whereas, prior to the
1970s, most blood was purchased. But payment for blood is still not unheard of and has
continued under certain circumstances. Jennifer Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86
VA. L. REV. 163, 172 (2000) (citing several studies).
29

ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 18.

30

Id. at 15.

31

Id. at 15, 46 (citing National Data Reports on OPTN website, at http://www.optn.org).
This data is continuously updated and revised.
32
33

Id. at 1-2, 15-16, 46.

Id. at 16. Those awaiting kidney transplants make up approximately seventy plus
percent of the waiting list and, thus, are the dominant factor in the growing need for organs.
Id. at 46.
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result from the inadequate organ supply, have led to multiple calls for reforming the
donation system, as well as an international black market in organs.34
Currently in the United States, a deceased donor’s eligibility requires meeting
neurological death criteria plus opting-in through consent given by the deceased
prior to death or from the next of kin after death.35 Depending on the study, only a
small percentage of deaths each year in the United States meet the neurological death
criteria. The figures are approximately between 12,000 to 16,000. Within this pool
of potential donors, consent to donate rates vary among Organ Procurement
Organizations (“OPOs”) from somewhere in between thirty and seventy percent.36
Consent rates are increasing slowly with improvements in identifying candidates and
processes for approaching and asking family members to participate in organ
donation. By law, hospitals must request permission from relatives to recover organs
from deceased candidates, but there is no presumption of consent, and in the absence
of consent, organs cannot be collected.37
Multiple avenues for increasing the supply are being pursued. Best practices for
approaching families and seeking donations are constantly being refined and
implemented. Furthermore, gift of life initiatives are being encouraged in schools
and workplaces and through driver education programs. The Institute of Medicine
(“IOM”) is advocating expanding the pool of potential donors by changing the
criteria from neurological death to cardiovascular death.38 Yet the supply today
remains inadequate to meet the ever increasing demand.
Direct sale of organs for transplant is illegal.39 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(“UAGA”), adopted in 1968 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and amended in 1987, permits donation from cadavers for
transplants and medical research. All fifty states have adopted the UAGA in some
part. While the UAGA does not address the sale of organs or other body parts, the
National Organ Transplant Act, enacted by the United States Congress in 1984,

34

See supra note 8.

35

ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 22.

36

Id. at 22-25 (discussing dramatically differing consent rates among OPOs). Each organ
transplant center is associated with an OPO. See discussion infra note 38 and accompanying
text for discussion of the organ distribution system in the United States.
37

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1314-1445 (West 1986) (requiring
all hospitals receiving Medicare or Medicaid funds to institute “required request” policies).
Hospital accreditation standards also require request and referral policies as part of
accreditation. ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 101.
38

ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 281-82. Expanding the pool by expanding eligibility
to include circulatory criteria could dramatically increase the pool size, but there are numerous
challenges that must be met in order to accomplish such an expansion. Id. at 22-25, 127-74.
39

National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. Law 98-507, 42 U.S.C. Sections 273274(f) make it illegal “for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects
interstate commerce.” For discussion of events leading up to the NOTA, see ORGAN
DONATION, supra note 1, at 230-32. Many states also have enacted state laws making the sale
of organs illegal. But note that the sale of other body parts that are renewable, such as sperm
and blood, is not illegal. Id. at 230.
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expressly prohibits the sale of organs for transplant. It does not address the sale of
organs for other purposes or body parts other than organs, although some states
expressly ban the sale of organs for any purpose and the sale of body parts. Virginia,
for example, bans the sale of any natural body part for any reason but excepts hair,
blood, and other self-replicating body fluids.40
Despite these efforts, organs are bought and sold on black markets. Traffic in
organs from executed Chinese prisoners or the poor and desperate in Brazil, Russia,
India, and other less developed, poor nations is well documented.41 The IOM’s 2006
report on organ donation discusses a study of individuals in Chennai, India, who sold
kidneys to pay off debt. Ultimately, these organ transplants resulted in poor
outcomes for all involved. There were complications, including sepsis, hepatitis B,
and liver cirrhosis, as well as other complications in those who received the organs,
and there were no long-term benefits to the donors, as their health deteriorated
without adequate follow-up care.42 Moreover, the ability of donors to work or take
care of their families deteriorated even further from where it had been prior to the
loss of an organ.43
As to the legal distribution systems, significant logistical and ethical difficulties
arise with distributing the inadequate supply of organs in this country.
Consequently, Congress created a highly organized system of OPOs associated with
transplant centers. The OPOs receive all donated organs through a distribution
system run by a private organization under contract with the Health and Human
Services Administration–currently, the United Network for Organ Sharing
(“UNOS”).44
UNOS and the OPOs have made continuous efforts to improve donor rates and
distribute organs in a just and fair manner. They have made slow but steady
progress.45 Because of the slow progress, the fact that need outstrips demand, and
the desperation of those in need, numerous alternatives in addition to the black
40

VA CODE § 32.1-291.16.

41

See supra note 8; see also Goodwin, supra note 6, at 309 (citing Organs for Sale:
China’s Growing Trade and Ultimate Violation of Prisoners’ Rights: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Int’l Operations and Human Rights of the Comm. on Int’l Relations, 107th
Cong. 24 (2001) (testimony that “the traffic in human organs, tissues, and body parts” is
extensive and occurring in China, India, Brazil, and other countries); see also Michael Finkel,
Complications, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2001 (detailing extensive international trade of organs
from executed Chinese prisoners supplying organs to American patients).
42

ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 274.

43

Id.

44

The UNOS, a non-profit private organization, has administered the Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network (OPTN) since its inception. ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at
20-21. Under federal law, all OPOs and transplant centers must participate in the OPTN. Id.
at 20. UNOS employs complex algorithms to allocate organs based on numerous factors,
which it revises and updates as needed. Id. However, the OPTN has little involvement with
living donor transplants and does not oversee tissue donation. Id. at 31.
45

Id. at 104-20; 189-99. UNOS is constantly seeking to make its system more fair. See,
e.g., Laura Meckler, Picking Willers: More Kidneys for Transplants May Go to Young Policy to Stress Benefit to Patient Over Length of Time on Waiting List, Wall St. J., Mar. 10,
2007, at A1.
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market arose over time. In the case of kidneys and livers (a small section can be
used), for example, live donor transplants have become increasingly common.46
While the most obvious living donors are relatives, living donations from
complete strangers are increasing. The Internet has proved to be a ripe universe for
desperate individuals on the waiting list, and Internet matching websites have
become more common.47 Desperate individuals with resources can post donor
requests on the Internet and engage in publicity campaigns through billboards and
local media.48 These individuals essentially throw all their resources into finding a
willing live donor. While, technically, they cannot pay the donor, they can
compensate the donor for lost work time and travel, as well as hospital, medical, and
other similar out-of-pocket expenses. Such tactics have proved successful in a
limited number of known cases.49
States are starting to experiment with a variety of tactics for increasing both
cadaveric and live donor rates. Wisconsin gives state tax breaks to benefit organ
donors, and dozens of states are following Wisconsin’s lead by granting $10,000 in
tax deductions for expenses such as travel, hotel bills, and lost wages.50
Pennsylvania passed legislation which creates a fund from $1 donations collected
voluntarily at the time a person applies for a driver’s license or registers a vehicle.51

46

A part of a lung lobe, the intestine, and the pancreas can also be transplanted from a
living donor. Also domino heart transplants can occur. See UNOS, http://unos.org/in the
News/factsheets.asp?fs=2 (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
47

See, e.g., Internet Kidney Op Gets Go-Ahead, BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/3758392.stm.
48

See, e.g., Scott Dodd, Wanted: Kidney Donor, Chance for Health; Mom’s Desperate Ad
Nets Calls for Ailing Daughter, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 20, 2004, at 1A (describing a
mother running an ad in the Sunday classifieds for more than a month for a kidney for her
daughter and complete strangers calling and going for testing to see if they were a match); Tim
Eaton, A Public Plea Woman with Liver Disease Seeks Help Through Billboard, CORPUS
CHRISTI CALLER-TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1; Paul Harasim, I Need An Organ Donor, LAS
VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Aug. 25, 2004, at 1A (describing use of personal website, media
interviews, and billboards by individuals in need of an organ); A.J. Hostetler, UNOS Opposes
Transplant Appeals; Board Says It’s Not Fair When Patients Solicit Organs for Themselves,
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Nov. 20, 2004, at A-1; Anne Marie Kilday, Organ Network
Moves To End “Cutting In Line” Houston Man’s Use of Billboards Spurs a Push To Halt
Donor Solicitation, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 20, 2004, at A1.
49

Forty-six donors have been matched with recipients through one website,
MatchingDonors.com. Joann Klimkiewicz, The Kindness of Strangers: Foes Don’t Stop
MatchingDonors.com from Connecting the Needy with the Generous, HARTFORD COURANT,
Aug. 12, 2007, at Lifestyle. Increasingly, such websites are gaining acceptance. UNOS, for
instance, has stepped back from its initial opposition to such matches and now takes no stance
on how donors and recipients meet. Id.
50
Amanda Paulson, More States Explore Tax Breaks To Benefit Organ Donors, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, OCT. 19, 2004, at 2. Federal legislation which authorized
grants to support similar reimbursement plans tacitly endorses such experimentation with nondirect compensation schemes. Id.
51

Gregory Boyd, Considering a Market in Human Organs, 4 NC J.L. & TECH. 417, 459
(2003).
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The fund is designed to provide up to $3,000 per cadaveric donor to help the family
with reasonable hospital, medical, and funeral expenses.52 The expenses are paid
directly to the provider to avoid conflicting with the ban on payment for organs.53 In
January 2002, the state fund became operational and paid $3,000 in such expenses to
nineteen families who applied in the first six months.54 Most recently, a legislator in
South Carolina introduced legislation that would shorten the term of a prisoner’s
sentence if she chooses to donate an organ.55
These methods are not without controversy. Living donation is still ethically
controversial because it violates one of the primary tenets of medical ethics: “Above
all [or first] do no harm.”56 Technically, a living donor is doing harm to herself, and
many medical ethicists and doctors are uncomfortable with living donation unless it
is a family member.57 Financial incentives of any sort, whether tax deductions or
reimbursement of expenses, are also controversial because they are seen as a step
toward commodification of the body.
Conversely, the failure to encourage more living donation is also controversial.
The economics of kidney transplant over dialysis is clear; despite the significant
costs of a kidney transplant, it is significantly less expensive than ongoing dialysis
for a patient. Iran, for example, engaged in a program of purchasing kidneys for
transplant.58 And, in the United States, there are many proposals for increasing
supply through permitting monetary and other incentives.59 It is unclear, however,
whether such incentives would increase the supply.60
In summary, the United States enforces altruism for most donors but permits
some minor forms of compensation. Thus, it has allowed significant markets to
evolve on the backs of enforced altruism. Underneath this somewhat conflicting
system of altruism and markets, multiple alternative systems, including black
markets, have developed. It is a system described as a blend of “altruism and
commerce, . . . voluntarism and coercion; of gift, barter, and theft.”61 Unfortunately,
52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Seanna Adcox, South Carolina Looks at Giving Inmates Reduced Sentences for Organ
Donations, THE A.P., Mar. 9, 2007, at 3A.
56

TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 113 (5th
ed. 2001).
57
While it is controversial in that it violates the do no harm ethic of doctors, from the
donor’s perspective it is a self-regarding act that is not harming others, but helping others, and
would be permissible under the social philosophy of John Stuart Mill, for example. JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859).
58

ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 29, 34.

59
The list of alternatives suggested is quite broad and ranges from creating futures
markets, to granting preferences on waiting lists to those who have consented to organ
donation, to granting discounted insurance premiums or an estate tax credit for donors.
60
61

ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 242-44.

Michele Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits, supra note 6, at 307 (citing Nancy Scheper-Huges,
The Organ of Last Resort, UNESCO COURIER, July/Aug. 2001, at 50-51).
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at times, within this system, “[i]nformation is poorly distributed if not concealed, and
the failure to develop a social policy for the many is mitigated only by the self-help
of the few–in particular, those few who are fittest for bargaining or litigation.”62
Aggravating this state of affairs is the absence of a clearly articulated legal and
ethical approach to body parts. How to treat body parts, however, is far from
obvious, as the case law and scholarly literature addressing body parts is
considerably conflicted over the best approach to apply. Each potential framework
offers something that is appealing, but each also has difficulty in meeting all of the
concerns that surround the body.
III. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO BODY PARTS
A variety of frameworks for body parts are reviewed in turn below.
A. The Body As Owned Property: Creating Markets in Body Parts
Whether to treat the body and its parts as property has been a consistent source of
controversy since bioethics arose as an academic field in the late 1950s and early
1960s. Paul Ramsey, an early bioethicist, argued that the “body is so inseparable
from the person that people should not trade in it.” On the other hand, Joseph
Fletcher, another renowned early bioethicist, argued that the sale of body parts does
not necessarily implicate the overall dignity of the person because personhood is
more than just the body: “self-awareness, curiosity, concern for others.”63 Fletcher
concluded, therefore, that the sale of body parts is not necessarily ethically
objectionable.64
Literature supporting these contradictory positions is abundant, and the debate
continues without resolution.65 Those in favor point to the reality of a marketplace,
commercial exchanges, and profits being made in body parts.66 Given this reality,
supporters of property rights in the body make many justice arguments in favor of
62

Gitter, supra note 23, at 338-39.

63

71 UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: NEW DEVELOPMENTS
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 131-32 (1987).
64
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Id.
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Many authors have argued in favor of treating the body as property or the proper subject
of market treatment. See, e.g., Jennifer Mahoney, supra note 28; James F. Blumstein, Federal
Organ Transplantation, A Time for Reassessment, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 451 (1989); Lloyd
R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989); Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for
Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 57 (1989); Lori Andrews, My Body, My
Property, 16 HAST. CTR. REP. 28 (1986). On the other hand, many authors just as strenuously
argue that the body should not be treated as property. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, supra note 3, at
365 (arguing for privacy treatment but, in footnote 15, listing the following opposing property
treatment: Stephen Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against, Property Rights in Body Parts, 11 SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y NO. 2, 259 (1994); LEON R. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE 283
(1985); and Richard Gold, Owning our Bodies: An Examination of Property Law and
Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167 (1995)); Paul P. Lee, The Organ Supply Dilemma,
Acute Responses to a Chronic Shortage, 20 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 363 (1986); ALAN
HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 3 (1997).
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treating the body parts as owned products that could be exchanged for value in
markets.67 Others, seeking to increase limited supplies of organs, argue that
monetary or other market-based incentives are long overdue, as markets create more
efficient delivery and distribution mechanisms and will increase a too small supply.
Finally, philosophical and policy arguments regarding the special place property
rights have in our legal landscape and their linkage to our notions of liberty are also
drawn upon to support the property rights paradigm.
On the other hand, treating body parts as property poses significant risk to our
notions of what it means to be human by starting us on a path that virtually
commodifies everything. The body is one of the last places of sanctuary from a
commodified world. Many individuals experience visceral reactions against
payment for human body parts. The root of those feelings can be difficult to discern.
For some, they may stem from a strong notion that human body parts should be held
sacrosanct and protected from the realm of our market economy. Regardless of their
root, however, those feelings reveal that we are in terrain that is difficult to negotiate
when dealing with the human body given the layers of meaning we impose on our
bodies.
Arguments and feelings against commodification of body parts are, in some
sense, similar to arguments raised centuries ago against commodifying labor as
economies in Europe moved from feudal to market systems.68 Fighting against such
commodification is in all likelihood equally doomed given the inevitable march of
markets. Nonetheless, this paper seeks to protect the threatened values and to
prevent the seemingly inevitable reification of the body as a tradeable object within
our markets by preserving a space for something entitled to more dignity than that
accorded widgets while accommodating the evolving and very real markets and trade
in body parts.
1. Benefits of Property and Market Treatment
Many strong arguments support those who argue in favor of a property-like
treatment of body parts: (1) the reality of existing markets in body parts; (2) the
concrete and well understood rules associated with property; (3) the malleability and
flexibility of the legal concept of property; (4) market efficiency in allocating supply
to meet demand as well as market incentives’ potential for increasing supply; (5)
property’s compatibility with our underlying liberal political philosophies; (6)
making it fairer to the donors who are the only ones in a long stream of transactions
not receiving compensation; and finally, (7) potentially enhancing the value accorded
body parts in our market-based society.
First, the notion that there are no markets in body parts has been debunked by
numerous scholars. Recent data shows that such markets not only exist, but are
thriving. Organ transplants, for example, have a cost. Medicare alone spent $0.8
billion on organ acquisition and transplantation in 2003.69 Of the fifty-nine organ
procurement agencies operating today, at least forty sell body parts directly to for-
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Id.
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See, e.g., JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST (1667),
DAVID HAWKES (2004).
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AND INTRODUCTION TO

PUBLICATION BY

2007-08]

REDEFINING STEWARDSHIP OVER BODY PARTS

87

profit firms.70 Payment is made for eggs and sperm, and, under limited
circumstances, blood. The tissue industry has become a billion dollar industry, not
to mention the biotechnology industry which also derives many products, such as
cell lines, from human body parts. These rapidly evolving and very real markets
demand clear and understood rules. Part of the attraction of using property concepts
is that it is a familiar legal field developed over centuries with ready-made concrete
rules associated with it that can be pulled off the rack and applied to different
situations.
Supporters of a property/ownership based paradigm argue that the concept of
property is not fixed or immutable but rather flexible enough to accommodate new
functions.71 Property has evolved from a reified absolute thing, as understood by the
eighteenth century English legal scholar Blackstone,72 to the notion commonly taught
in law school today of a “bundle of sticks,” representing relationships between a
subject vis-à-vis an object.73 But property is not limited to these conceptions, for
other theorists seek to expand it further.74
Given property’s flexibility, some legal scholars argue that property and
associated contractual rights are best suited to protect individuals and patients today;
whereas, the current predominant protection, the fiduciary duty owed by a doctor to
70

Michelle Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits, supra note 6, at 383.

71

See Mahoney, supra note 28, at 202; see also Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for
Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant
Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 193 (2004) (“property rights are dynamic, ever changing. .
. .”); Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails,
Utility Licenses, and The Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the
Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L. Q. 351 (2000); STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF
PROPERTY (1990) (property is “not a universal and immutable concept.”).
72
See Carol Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L. J. 601,
601 (1998) (quoting Blackstone as stating: “There is nothing which so generally strikes the
imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world,
in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”). Rose does show,
however, that Blackstone’s understanding of property was more nuanced than the absolutist
proposition. Nonetheless, this conception of property is frequently attributed to his
Commentaries and scholarship.
73
There are many differing theories and schools of property. There are the absolutists who
advocate a concept of property as a static reified thing; there is the prevailing model of a
bundle of sticks; there are the essentialists who advocate that there is one single variable
essential as a foundational principle; there are the multiple variable essentialists; and there are
the anominalists who contend that there is no fixed content to property, but rather that it is a
fluid concept. See Rose, supra note 62; see also A. M. Honore, Ownership,in OXFORD ESSAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE 112-28 (Oxford 1961); W.N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913).
74

See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay 100 YALE L. J. 127, 129 (1990)
(listing a variety of property theories and also explaining her idea of a broader property theory
based on what she contends also existed in the past that included not only “external objects
and people’s relationships to them, but also all of those human rights, liberties, powers and
immunities that are important for human well-being” and encompassed the inherent tension
between the “individual and the collective”); see also MUNZER, supra note 71.
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his or her patient, is woefully inadequate. The patient/doctor fiduciary duty is
limited to the relationship between the physician and the patient, and that
relationship is fairly circumscribed by the patient’s medical needs.75 Given the
multiple additional layers of relationships that can exist in the research and
biomedical industry context, which extend far beyond the traditional patient/doctor
relationship to the hospitals, health maintenance organizations, research institutions,
tissue banks, and the like, something with more teeth than the traditional fiduciary
duty, like property, is appealing.
Moreover, property is linked in our political philosophy with our autonomy and
freedom. John Locke developed a theory of property that lies at the foundation of
our vision of society and our markets. Property becomes ours, under Locke’s
reasoning, when we mix our labor with something. That the individual “owns” his
body is essential to this theory.76 This same theory lies at the foundation of our
social contract that individual human beings own their own bodies and the products
of the body such as labor, for example.77 That unique ownership creates a barrier
between the individual and the state, a line that requires individual consent and
acceptance of the state’s power. Because one of our society’s bedrock foundational
principles is a sense of autonomy derived from the same principles regarding the
individual’s rights of ownership over the body and mixed labor products, it is easy–
by extension–to develop arguments that individuals own their bodies and can dispose
of its parts just as they dispose of its labor. Such a theory is attractive to many.78
Similarly, our constitutional theories of privacy rely on earlier case law finding
an ownership right of sorts over our persons.79 We tend to use the same spatial
metaphors to describe our privacy and our property rights and to create “boundaries”

75
See Gitter, supra note 23, at 306; see also Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary
Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System,
21 AM. J. L. AND MED. 241, 250 (1995).
76
See Rao, supra note 3, at 367-68. (quoting Locke as stating, “Through the Earth and all
inferior Creatures be common to all men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person.
This is no Body has any Right to but himself.”). Through this ownership, Locke reasoned the
individual owns external things that are the product of his or her body’s labor. Yet, Locke
viewed the ownership of the body itself as more of an inalienable trust than ownership of a
thing. But it was through that right that Man created things and then owned those things
external to the body. See id.
77

Jacob Dahl Rendtorff, Biobanks and the Rights to Human Body, in THE USE OF HUMAN
BIOBANKS–ETHICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS REPORT I, 55, 58 (M.G.
Hansson, ed., 2001).
78
Rao, supra note 3, at 367-68. By contrast, Kant critiqued Locke and his brand of
utilitarianism arguing that turning the human into an object of ownership violates individual
dignity and turns ends into objects. Id.
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The first case officially finding a privacy right in the Constitution is Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In the abortion case Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court
traced the privacy right back to 19th century case law, Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250 (1891). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The Court in Union found a
“right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference by others.” Union, 141 U.S. at 251.
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between us and the state and others.80 Thus, our liberal values of personal freedom
and self-determination push us towards a theory of ownership in our bodies and, by
extension, to allowing trade in our bodies.
And in many senses we already treat body parts, such as organs and tissue, as
property, simply incommensurable property. We can devise in our will our body
parts as gifts. We cannot sell them, but we may give them away in a will, just as we
give property away. Such treatment in wills is typically reserved for what we deem
to be property.81
But perhaps most powerful are the justice arguments made in favor of the
property rights regime. Everyone, other than the original donor in the tissue and
organ market, exchanges money and benefits. What justification is there for
segmenting out one portion of the transaction and making it non-compensable with
money when every other transaction in the chain involves an exchange of money?82
Some view this as simply unjust to the donor in that it is unnecessarily paternalistic
in denying the poor, for example, the ability to exploit one of the few resources they
may have and, thus, their freedom to use this resource as they deem fit.83
Moreover, the poor face a double injustice in the case of organs because they
often cannot afford or obtain insurance, and the UNOS distribution system requires
both insurance and the ability to purchase the expensive immunosuppressant drugs
required to prevent organ rejection.84 Thus, the poor (1) are denied payment for an
organ if they choose to donate one and (2) cannot receive an organ if they need one.85
Plainly, avoiding all compensation because of concerns regarding luring poor
individuals with improper inducement does not solve the problem. Moreover,
alternatives for protecting individuals’ interests exist. For example, we already pay
research subjects for participating in studies and control for undue inducement with
detailed informed consent procedures, thus allowing individuals to exercise their
freedom of choice.86
Supporters of the property paradigm further point to markets as the most efficient
distribution system–that is a method of matching supply and demand. They contend
that markets have proven themselves as the most efficient distributors of goods.87
Price systems provide proven methods to solve information and coordination
problems.88 The current regime, in contrast, creates an anti-commons problem where
there are multiple rights to veto donation. “[W]here more than one entity has the
80
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power to exclude others from the use of a resource,” the chances that a valueenhancing transaction will occur is significantly decreased and an anti-commons
problem arises.89 In essence, the recognition of too many rights hinders discoveries,
research, and the most efficient use of resources. If payment is permitted, however,
those who pay are virtually always the most likely to put the paid-for resource to the
most efficient use.90
Moreover, alternatives to outright bans on payment exist. For example, instead
of banning hazardous work, we regulate it to reduce the risk. Such regulations
typically require clear disclosure and consent.91 But in the cordoned-off realm of
organs, by relying on altruism alone, not only do we limit the supply to the extreme
detriment of many, but we also bestow significant commercial gains on others.92
Given the clear mismatch between demand and supply, some argue that
experimentation with other paradigms, such as property, is necessary. Clear rules,
they argue, can prevent exploitation and respect individuals’ autonomy, just as the
rules regarding payment to research subjects protect those subjects.
Proponents of a property-like treatment further contend that it is far from obvious
that payment will diminish our respect for ourselves; whereas, naysayers tend to
argue the opposite effect.93 Many body parts such as sperm, blood, and hair can be
and are commodified and exchanged for monetary value without violating our
human dignity. Monetary value is assigned to many things that have greater value
than just the dollars and cents exchanged. For example, we assign value to wedding
rings, wrongful death actions, negligent diagnostic tests, and life insurance.94 We do
not reduce these things to their monetary features alone. To most of us their value is
not solely commensurable in a one-to-one relationship with the monetary value
assigned to these items. Consequently, proponents of property treatment contend
little in our experience suggests that we devalue something by merely attaching a
monetary value to it. Indeed, to the contrary, given the prevalence of market
exchange in our society as the thread which holds us together, placing monetary
value suggests we value it even though the monetary value may not represent its full
meaning and value to us. Monetary compensation, therefore, can potentially
enhance the dignity and value of body parts.95
89
Id. at 203; see also Wright, supra note 61. Of course, this argument applies also if a
property right is recognized, as many individuals may overvalue their parts and become
holdouts—see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
90

Gitter, supra note 23.
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92

Id.

93

Troy Jensen, Organ procurement: Various Legal Systems and Their Effectiveness, 22
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 555 (2000).
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Gitter, supra note 23, at 301; Gitter argues that those who object to putting a value on
tissue are like those who adamantly opposed life insurance when it was first proposed as
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Id. at 301-02. Indeed, there is a “strongly competing truism suggesting that which we
reward with money is that which we value.” Id. (citing Majorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 297, 336 (1990)).
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2. Shortcomings of a Property Regime for Body Parts
Those who argue against treating the body as property are primarily concerned
about the (1) devaluation through commodification of something that is priceless; (2)
reification and objectification of that which is inherently subjective, and hence, the
long-term consequences for how we view and relate to ourselves; (3) perpetuating
injustices through accentuating the oppression of the poor or other marginal social
groups; and (4) encouraging the sick and desperate to donate diseased parts, thus
tainting the supply.96 Moreover, there is a primal visceral and well documented
disgust factor regarding commerce in body parts that cannot be ignored, as it speaks
to our feelings about ourselves as human beings.97 Each of these arguments needs to
be fleshed out so to speak.
The human body “is a social, ritual and metaphorical entity . . . layered with
ideas, images, cultural meanings and personal associations.”98 Layered on top of
those meanings is the biotechnology revolution, which is increasingly enabling the
alteration by scientists of what we previously considered off limits to manipulation:
nature–life and death processes.99 As this occurs, parts of what are essential for life
are increasingly becoming modified and commodified. For example, the United
States Patent Office has allowed the patenting of DNA sequences,100 the building
blocks of life itself; however, Europe steadfastly continues to disallow the patenting
of genes.
We sense that the very thing that makes us human is becoming commodified.
Through that commodification it becomes a “thing”–a reified object. While those in
favor of property argue that this is an outdated absolutist conception of property and
that property really describes a set of relationships (the proverbial bundle of sticks)
between a subject and a thing, this does not comport with everyday lived
experiences. In everyday life, most people relate to property as a thing or something
to acquire, to use, and to put on display, such as an object that is to be manipulated
and coveted. But even accepting the bundle of sticks conception poses problems. If
applied to the body, viewing property as a bundle of different relationships among
persons or other entities with respect to things is a way of disaggregating–
fragmenting the body and distributing its discrete components. Literally and
figuratively this conception of property alienates us from our bodies and selves as
wholes, turning them into discrete alienable parts.101
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The importance of our relationships with our bodies cannot be underestimated,
for we are embodied consciousness. We relate to the world, experience it, and
understand it all through our bodies. All of our experience is mediated through our
senses and our brains (neurological processing and interpreting of the information
our five senses take in through our bodies).102 Through the blood stream carrying
chemical signals (e.g., hormones and neurotransmitters) and the sensory and motor
peripheral nerves carrying signals to our brains, we depend upon our bodies for data
to interpret and to understand the world.103 “Our minds, our consciousness, our
thought patterns, and behavior–our very being–is ‘embodied,’ in the full sense of the
term.”104 The body provides the very “content” that constitutes “the workings of a
normal mind.”105 We are our bodies.106
The IOM opines that if body parts, such as organs, are not “donated,” they are
then “sold,” thereby becoming a “commodity.”107 When an object becomes a
product in the market, “a social construction process occurs” as the object is
“commoditized.”108 Legal scholar Margaret Jane Radin describes body parts as
“contested commodities” because “we experience personal and social conflict about
the process and the result.”109 Because our “minds exist in and for an integrated
organism,”110 when something becomes “commodified” and a price is associated
102
ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTE’S ERROR, EMOTION, REASON AND THE HUMAN BRAIN
90-93 (1994).
103

Id. at 87-88.

104
Id. at 118, 234. While there is no consensus or complete account of consciousness yet,
there is a general consensus that consciousness is derived from our neurological systems and
that our “experiences are embodied, and thus realized in some kind of material process.”
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT 58 (2001). In other words, materialism is
the dominant view today of how we think and feel. As Nussbaum states, ‘[w]e can happily
state that in human beings thought and emotion are, even necessarily are, enmattered forms.”
Id. at 59.
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DAMASIO, supra note 102, at 226.
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Yet, the old dualism of a separation between mind and body still exists in our thinking.
Some argue that the failure of courts (discussed infra in section IV) and others to
satisfactorily answer the problem of whether and, if so, what types of rights exist in the body
is rooted in Descarte’s mind/body dichotomy. See, e.g., Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies:
Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331 (1996)
(explaining that leaving the old mind/body dichotomy behind and thinking of the self as
situated in the body and its parts poses significant challenges to the intellectual origins of our
legal system).
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RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 83, at xi; see also HYDE, BODIES OF LAW,
supra note 65 (arguing that legal thinkers should recognize and confront the constructed
nature of their representations of the body).
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Perhaps because “certain things outside our control are important to us and important to
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“undoubtedly some of us have such feelings toward our body parts,” we are conflicted.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 94, at 22.
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with it as an objective good in a market place, our mind associates many different
things with that process.111
What are social meanings associated with trade and commerce in “goods”?
Markets are the center and backbone of our societies. They are a significant
achievement of human freedom and, as many scholars have demonstrated, intimately
connected to democratic government forms.112 Yet markets also represent the
concept of “maximizing individual gains from trade.”113 Efficiency is the ideal and
achieved through cost-benefit trade-offs. What are the ramifications of associating
notions of efficiency and cost benefit analysis to our bodies and selves for our
understanding of our freedom, personhood, and politics?114 In Radin’s words, adding
our bodies to the category of commensurable in monetary terms poses significant
challenges to our conceptions of self and what it means to be human.115 It imposes a
view of society where everything is commoditized.116 The long-term impact on our
understandings of our relationships with ourselves and others is bound to change in
significant and, perhaps, unforeseeable ways. “Commodification is a kind of
objectification or reductionism that may lead people to see themselves and each
other as repositories of body parts with market worth rather than entities with
dignity.”117 In other words, applying the language and concepts of the marketplace
with which property is intimately bound to ourselves “diminish[es] our sense of
particularity and uniqueness” and impacts “our perceptions . . . about who we are and
what is important in our lives.”118
In sum, the tension between personhood and thing hood is hard to reconcile or
negotiate.119 This tension illustrates that property, while a very flexible and useful
legal concept, is not flexible enough given its market orientation to accommodate our
more “emotional and spiritual concerns” which are associated with the legal
characterization of personal control over one’s body, both before and after death.120
111
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what we currently do is tolerate market activity but disallow market discourse. Id. This
inconsistency leads to, in their views, unscrutinized and unregulated market activity that is
ultimately more harmful and unjust than that which the discourse seeks to prevent. Id.
119

See, e.g., Rendtorff, supra note 67 (discussing the tension between the connotations of
commodification of the human body versus an individual’s rights over his or her body and its
labor products).
120

R. Alto Charo, Legal Characterizations of Human Tissue, in TRANSPLANTING HUMAN
TISSUE, supra note 6, at 101, 102. Ironically, this same loss of a bright line between body and
mind which makes us so uncomfortable with placing prices on objects is also probably what is

94

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 21:75

Property does not map onto the human body in a “one to one match.”121 Because of
these very real concerns, the IOM counsels against even pilot studies offering
compensation for organs or tissue, as once body parts become a commodity, these
meanings change, and there may be no turning back.122
The property paradigm’s problems are not limited to the long-term understanding
of ourselves as humans but also include justice and supply problems. The justice
arguments cut both ways. While there are significant concerns that it is too
paternalistic to impose limitations on what the poor or disenfranchised may do with
their bodies by denying them one of the few assets they may have, there are equal
concerns that, by permitting sales of body parts, the poor will be further
disenfranchised and injustices will simply be perpetuated. The poor may value
money too much as they have so little of it and, thus, put their health at risk by
selling organs while alive.123 Justice concerns cut strongly both ways, and it is
difficult to discern which argument ought to prevail.
As to supply issues, there are arguments that compensation encourages the sick to
donate diseased organs, thereby tainting the supply. Testing, which must be done in
any event, somewhat overcomes this argument.
There is little hard data available as to whether the supply increases or decreases
with compensation.124 The efficient market arguments rely on free markets and their
underpinning axiom that if demand is high, prices rise, and output rises to meet the
higher price. But if the price rises too far, demand will curtail itself until the
demand, supply, and price reach an equilibrium. Plainly, certain basic assumptions
underlying a free market analysis do not apply to markets for body parts.125 Demand
for organs, for example, is controlled by individuals’ health, and very few
individuals would “choose” to die rather than pay too much for an organ. Moreover,
many do not perceive healthcare as a product that should be rationed out based on
the ability to pay. And even the desperately poor may decide not to sell their
relatives’ organs or body parts given feelings discussed above about our bodies.
Thus, supply is not necessarily driven by price.
Moreover, we have a limited understanding of peoples’ motives regarding
donation as demonstrated by the struggle to increase donation rates. Payment and
compensation could cause some to give and some not to give. Indeed, the IOM is
concerned that payment or compensation would “crowd out” altruistic giving,
leading families that might donate to refuse to donate because their gift had been

causing our inescapable march towards universal commodifications. Without an obvious
subject/object dichotomy, we cannot find an obvious stopping point for commodification.
Gordan & Postbrief, supra note 107, at 140-41; Radin, supra note 73.
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somehow cheapened.126 But aside from donors, doctors and nurses express
significant discomfort in asking for organs from a grieving family through offering
compensation.127 The skills and comfort level of those asking may impact actual
donation more than the motives of those consenting.128 We just do not know, and we
understand motivations poorly, as they vary significantly from person to person.
Ultimately, the irreconcilability of the advocates and opponents of property rights
positions, along with pressing justice and efficiency concerns, requires rethinking the
problem beyond simply a property right or not and imagining alternative new legal
structures.129 Many alternatives have been proposed. Like property, they too have
their advantages and disadvantages.
B. Partial Commoditization–Legislative and Regulatory Schemes
Proposals to address human body parts are by no means limited to a pure free
market property/commodification versus no compensation scheme. Radin and
others demonstrate that whether to treat body parts as a commodity is not an all or
nothing proposition. We have, in our current society, many instances of incomplete
or partial commodification in that our reality is “far more complex” than just the
polar extremes.130 Moreover, both of the extremes arguably force disrespect of
personhood.131 Commodification does so by devaluing it, and non-commodification
does so by reinforcing powerlessness, narrowing choices, and threatening freedom
over one’s own body.132 Our “traditional liberal compartmentalization is at best
oversimplified and cannot lead to the kind of answer” that is called for to solve our
dilemma over body parts.133
Examples of alternative compensatory schemes exist. Our tort system and our
workers’ compensation systems, for example, compensate individuals by attaching
price compensation to bodies. These systems, however, operate under liability rules,
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not property rules.134 Labor markets are another example. Labor of the human body,
a by-product, is bought and sold. Yet we regulate our labor markets to balance the
value of the work with our acknowledgement of the personhood and community of
the participants.135
Radin and others suggest a similarly balanced regulatory system for human body
parts.136 In theory, some of these proposals rely on a traditional distinction drawn on
our relationship to certain things and rights and how they are governed by either
property rules, liability rules (e.g., tort system), or inalienability rules (cannot be sold
or alienated).137 There is an important fourth category of things which can be
separated and given, but not sold. These are things that are not outside our realm of
social intercourse but are outside of the market because they are incommensurable
with monetary value. This is exactly where the initial transfer of organs and tissue
falls currently.138 However, markets operate by making things, such as objects or
labor, commensurable with money or other items that can be exchanged. But there
are all sorts of market failures, such as information and coordination problems and
free riders and holdouts, which require alternative methods of handling situations.
Much regulation, including price regulation, safety regulation, product quality,
and the like, addresses market failures and can be seen as “in essence partial
commodification.”139 Within the last decade, there have been several proposals for
more just systems that regulate body parts. They attempt to meet both justice
concerns regarding sharing benefits derived from body parts and, perhaps, encourage
more efficient distribution systems while ideally avoiding some of the problems
inherent in markets. These proposals are legislative in nature and typically are
hybrid models, combining property, inalienability, and liability rules.
The proponents of government regulation contend that these proposals put to rest
or lessen some of the arguments against commodification because government
regulation through transparent socially articulated policies (1) lessens concerns
regarding undue inducement of the poor by putting in place protective measures and
(2) is less threatening to human dignity, altruism, and communitarian solidarity.140
134
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). See also Charlotte
H. Harrison, Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating
Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 77 (2002) (applying the three rules from
Calebresi and Melahmed’s article to body parts).
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Most of these proposals rest on the notion that monetary payment does not
necessarily entail commodification if price is assessed on a collective non-market
basis rather than in private negotiations. Such a process applies a liability rule along
the lines of workers’ compensation instead of a property rule.141
Charlotte Harrison, for example, advocates a general default rule of donation for
all research tissue but with an objective, non-market mechanism built-in after
research use for the unusual case where samples prove to have significant
commercial value, such as in the case of John Moore discussed in Sections II and
IV.142 Consequently, research derived from the donated raw materials which results
in valuable medical products would be rewarded proportionately, not simply
included always nor excluded always.
To reach this result, Harrison advocates a legislative solution, as she argues
legislatures stand in the best position to make the tradeoffs between complicated
uncertainties through a transparent process of gathering empirical evidence,
soliciting expert advice, and holding hearings.143 This stands in contrast to the
current process in which much tissue is donated without knowledge or consent,
which she argues is an affront to human dignity and autonomy.144 People are treated
as means, not ends, thereby violating many different religious and philosophical
systems of respect for human dignity. Through a legislative oriented process,
however, all parties can be represented at hearings and a transparent consensus
settled upon. Moreover, creating some sort of transparent compensation system
avoids the increased scrutiny and skepticism attached to a market-inalienability
model due to the significant commercial gains and profits being reaped from human
tissue, genetics, and other body parts. It can eliminate the sense of injustice felt
today where certain companies gain financial rewards by imposing some sort of
return to the donor.145
Legislative solutions, such as Harrison’s proposal, address some of the economic
inefficiencies that might occur if private property rights were awarded to each
individual in his or her respective body parts and which worried the Moore court.146
Those inefficiencies are similar to a reverse tragedy of the commons. Too many
people holding private rights might prevent researchers and others from using the
property in a way that mutually benefits the whole community, hence stifling
research and development.147 Also, requiring individual negotiations with each
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individual, many who might have limited competence in the field and hold cognitive
biases overvaluing their assets, could create huge transaction costs, enormous
inefficiencies, and holdouts.148
Moreover, a good deal of research uses samples from numerous individuals
worldwide. Identities are often unknown, making bargaining next to impossible.
Thus, the time necessary to individually negotiate with each patient if he or she held
an outright property right would simply foreclose much research being done today
which requires multiple tissue samples.
Confirming the transaction costs, the United States Office of Technology
Assessment reported that actual compensation costs would not have a large impact
on research but that the transaction costs would dwarf payment costs and negatively
impact research.149 Thus, allowing or requiring individual permission from
individuals whose tissue is used in research would be too costly from a transactional
cost perspective. Negotiating time and effort, compliance staff costs, and the
likelihood of hold-outs all contribute to those costs. Adopting a model endorsing
pure property rights could, therefore, create transaction costs at the inception of the
research that could seriously harm the industry and also non-profit research.150
Proposals, like Harrison’s, attempt to address those initial costs by creating an
alternative legislatively directed process that is not applied at the inception of
research but after the research outcomes are known.151
Absent some legislative or other solution, ad hoc savvy patient groups and
individuals are implementing their own self-help contractual property rights regime.
In one instance, for example, a group of families whose children suffered from a rare
genetic disorder (Canavan’s disease) supplied combinations of tissue, autopsies,
blood, urine, personal data, other pathological samples, and funding to researchers.152
The group and the hospital, however, ultimately had significant disagreements over
the patenting and licensing of the resulting genetic test and the manner in which it
would be made available to the public. Plaintiffs sued alleging unjust enrichment,
conversion of plaintiffs’ property, fraudulent concealment, and misappropriations of
trade secrets. The district court, relying on Moore, rejected the conversion claim
outright on a motion to dismiss, holding that there is no “property right in tissue.”153
In response to this result, groups are no longer relying on informal commitments
but requiring contractual relationships with researchers.154 For example, a non-profit
group serving parents and individuals with a rare genetic disorder, PXE
International, identified individuals with the disease or carriers and collected and
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenburg, Can Patents Deter Innovations?
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
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banked tissues.155 The group entered into a contractual relationship with the
researchers in which it would retain ownership rights in any patents.156 The group’s
goal was to ensure broad and affordable genetic testing.157 Not surprisingly, there
were some disputes ultimately between the university where the researchers were
based and the PXE group. Ultimately, they reached an agreement where they split
royalties and PXE makes all licensing decisions.158 While such an arrangement was
unprecedented, other groups are expected to follow suit. The Juvenile Diabetes
Foundation, for example, is pooling samples and creating a bio-repository.159
This private self-help remedy is a unique public-private model that is gaining
traction. It can improve public health by identifying and recruiting participants by
those most knowledgeable about the diseases. But it assumes in the absence of
legislation a contractual right of sorts in individuals’ tissue samples. This model
overcomes problems with individual negotiations by allocating the burden of
negotiations to privately organized non-profits, which presumably benefit the entire
group through their research. By creating a collective benefit and not allowing all of
the profits to be commercially reaped, but turning the profits back to the group
through either broadly based affordable tests or other additionally funded research
for cures, such groups potentially strengthen a sense of community and avoid the
unseemly appearance of individuals profiting from their disease.160
Instead of relying on such private groups, which exist only for certain diseases
and exclude those who might not participate with the group, Harrison argues we
should locate our approach to body parts somewhere between property rules and
inalienability.161 She advocates a simple and straightforward liability rule.162 Unlike
a property rule which encourages private transfers by sale or license and unlike an
inalienability rule which forbids compensation or transfer outright, a liability rule
permits compensation where the compensation is set by some sort of tribunal or
agency. Harrison, therefore, suggests what she terms an “appropriately timed nonmarket mechanism for assessing value and transferring compensation to contributors
of human tissue.”163 After a particular tissue has proved to be commercially
successful, she advocates using the political process to develop standards that can be
administered by an agency or tribunal to award compensation. An analogy would be
workers’ compensation, for example.
Harrison’s proposal is not the only legislative remedy suggested; differing
legislative solutions have been put forward. Donna Gitter, for example, argues for a
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hybrid using both property and liability rules.164 She finds Harrison’s proposal
inadequate because it denies research participants any authority to bargain
independently and could strip power from advocacy groups operating currently, such
as PXE International.165 She also believes that something more than our current
fiduciary duty and informed consent are necessary to protect individuals because
these rights do not allow individuals to control research on their tissue.166 She likes
the PXE International solution but believes it needs to be taken further.167 While
transaction costs associated with a property right can be significant, failure to award
compensation has its own costs because some refuse to give their tissue and thereby
decrease the supply of tissue.168 She argues that the transaction costs argument is a
nonstarter because these costs are already imbedded in the system.169 If informed
consent, as it is theoretically envisioned, were obtained, it would take the same
amount of bargaining and negotiating time. Furthermore, meticulous care and record
keeping are already required for tracking samples and their sources.
Gitter and others argue that equity and fairness require some form of
compensation, as researchers are permitted to own the tissue and be compensated for
it while drug and biotechnology companies are reaping tremendous profits from
donated raw materials.170 The lack of transparency in the current system and its
underlying inequity is disturbing. It calls out for reform and imposition of some
sense of greater equity.
Adding an element of compensation can encourage tissue donation and
encourage groups like PXE International’s members to propose research that might
not be done otherwise.171 Because property is a “flexible concept, not an all-ornothing one,”172 Gitter advocates compensation and sale of tissue for research in a
heavily regulated market, like our securities markets.173 In response to those who
make slippery slope arguments and raise the spectre of government takings of body
parts, she and others, such as Radin, contend that this is not a credible argument.174
No one seriously contends that the government or society would allow takings of
organs, tissue, or the like. The body could officially obtain a status akin to the home
under the homestead laws in bankruptcy, ensuring that it could not be reached by
debtors or sold under duress.
164
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While Harrison, Gitter, and others put forth interesting ideas, they fail to address
or account for the political realities and difficulties that would accompany their
implementation. They fail to consider the weight of opinions of the American
Society of Transplant Surgeons, which unanimously opposes the payment of any
money for organs, even in the form of a tax incentive,175 and the medical
establishment, as represented by the IOM, which counsels against any compensation
of any sort for organs.176 The biotechnology and medical lobbying communities’
opposition to any such proposals is not an insignificant barrier because these
interests are powerful and organized. In contrast, the call by citizens for
compensation has little in the way of organization and lobbying clout to back it up.
Aside from the absence of any realistic chance of implementation, there are
additional significant logistical problems not addressed by these proposals. For
example, there are often unintended consequences that must be avoided, such as
industry capture of the regulating body. The transaction costs of a new government
bureaucracy are enormous and are not even discussed. These problems, while not
insurmountable, are so large that they make passage of anything akin to them
unlikely. Instead, legislatures today are often more inclined toward smaller
incremental changes that do not create large new bureaucracies, such as limited tax
deductions.
C. Trust Paradigm
Before the enactment of the UAGA, our legal system at times referred to our
relationship with our bodies as akin to a sacred trust.177 A trust is a legal concept. It
is a legal entity created under the laws of a state by a grantor for the advantage of the
beneficiaries.178 “Confidence is reposed in one person, who is termed trustee, for the
benefit of another, who is called the [beneficiary], respecting property which is held
by the trustee for the benefit of the [beneficiary].”179 The subject of a trust, however,
is typically property, such as land, securities, and other items of value. The subject is
a thing separate from the trustee and beneficiary that is to be managed. Ownership is
separated into different elements and dispersed among different parties. The trust (a
legal entity, not a person) holds the title to the property, and the trustee manages the
property for the benefit of the beneficiaries, but the beneficiary, who ultimately
receives the benefits, neither owns nor controls the property. The trustee must
operate under the terms set forth in the initial granting document and has specific
duties with regard to the property being managed, as well as fiduciary duties to the
beneficiaries.180
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How would this work with respect to our bodies and their parts? Technically, the
body is the subject held in trust. But who are the grantor, the trustee, and the
beneficiary? These questions can be answered in a variety of different ways. Often,
the answer is based on religious belief. For example, according to some Christians,
“Our body was given to us by God and . . . he is the owner.”181 Under this belief, we
hold the body in trust and must be good stewards over the body while in possession
of it. But this is not the only possible answer, and multiple possibilities can be
imagined.
Ultimately, our society is composed of so many different religions and beliefs
that reliance on a trust concept, embedded in religious precepts, is unlikely to
succeed. Our bodies are so intertwined with who we are and how we view ourselves,
with so many competing versions, that how we treat our bodies under the law must
ultimately be sufficiently generic and acceptable from multiple perspectives. The
trust concept’s connection to certain religious beliefs is somewhat problematic, but
the concept holds some potentially important ideas in the fiduciary relationship
imbedded within it. Therefore, this concept will be revisited in Section VI.
D. Altruism and Consent–The Current U.S. Model
Generally speaking, the United States operates under an express consent rule for
solid organs and most tissue.182 This is an “opt-in” rule. There is no presumption
that an individual would give consent to donate his or her organs or tissue after
death. Instead he or she must have clearly demonstrated such a preference while still
alive, or after death a next of kin must clearly grant permission.183 As discussed,
federal legislation prohibits commercial transactions in organs,184 although recent
legislation permits limited reimbursement of expenses incurred by living donors.185
Thus, this opt-in consent model is based on altruism and thereby relies upon
individuals’ notions of community and willingness to help others.
Federal law requires hospitals to request from relatives organs of deceased
candidates.186 All states have enacted in some form the UAGA, which gives adults
the right to donate their organs for use upon death.187 Many jurisdictions have
enacted an amended UAGA, which provides that relatives cannot override expressed
intentions of donors. Federal law and most jurisdictions continue to prohibit the sale
of organs for transplant.
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Unfortunately, a number of individuals and/or their families still refuse to donate.
The timing of the requests, if an individual has not made a prior preference known,
makes the donation process difficult because grieving families are attempting to cope
with what is usually an unexpected and sudden death. Training those who make the
requests and different methods for making requests has improved consent rates, but
many potential organ donation candidates still do not donate under the current
model.
E. Opt-Out Policies: Presumed Consent and Routine Removal
Actual consent, however, is not the only possible model under an altruistic
paradigm that excludes payment for organs and tissue.188 Different approaches exist,
such as presumed consent or routine removal. As the name implies, presumed
consent means a deceased individual is presumed to have consented to donate tissue
and organs. In order to overcome this presumption, an individual, or next of kin,
must “opt-out” by expressly stating that the organs shall not be recovered. In the
absence of such an objection, an individual is deemed to have consented to
donation.189
For presumed consent to be valid, a number of conditions must be met. First, the
individuals or their families must understand the situation and know that refusal to
consent is an acceptable option.190 Second, they must have a reasonable time to
object and understand those time limits. Third, they must understand how to object
and have a relatively easy way to make their objection known. Fourth, there can be
no coercion, which means no negative effects on an individual if he or she
dissents.191 Finally, the individual must be competent for consent to occur, either
presumed or actual.192
Other theories can support implied consent as well. For example, society can
simply presume consent based on what the deceased person would have decided if he
or she had been asked–a substituted judgment of a sort.193 Or society could assume
“on the basis of a general theory of human values or on the basis of what reasonable,
altruistic people should and would do” that a donation should be made.194 Plainly,
the latter version of implied consent is somewhat paternalistic because the decision is
made for an individual rather than the individual understanding and making the
decision. These latter theories of consent which underlie routine removal regimes
are similar in their effect to presumed consent, but they are distinct conceptually
because their underpinning justifications differ significantly.195 Under this latter
188
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understanding, just as in presumed consent, routine removal occurs unless prior or
family objection is registered. But, instead of presuming consent by the individual as
the basis for donation, here the state or society presumes that society has a right to
the organs of a deceased individual.196
This assumption is “broadly” a
communitarian conception of society.197
Ultimately, each of these many theories of consent speaks to how we view our
own capabilities, and those of others and our decision-making power, that is whether
we make decisions regarding organs and our bodies as individuals or as a
community. The United States generally does not practice presumed consent or
routine removal, but there are exceptions. Presumed consent is, in effect, practiced
in a number of states with respect to certain body parts, such as corneas and pituitary
glands. Some states permit their removal during an autopsy to consider the cause of
death.198 It is not entirely clear whether these states are, in effect, treating the organs
as a communal form of property escheating to the state or actually assuming consent.
The statutes have nonetheless been quite effective in creating a sufficient supply of
these organs.199 While there is little understanding or public education about cornea
removal, there is generally little objection given their small size and relative
unimportance to the perceived “wholeness” of a cadaver. It is unlikely such routine
removal would meet with little objection if it were practiced as to all organs and
tissue.
Moreover, meeting the conditions of presumed consent is important. They are so
important that, in other countries that theoretically practice presumed consent,
doctors and hospitals still routinely tend to ask consent from families. That is
presumably because silence is so difficult to interpret and because it is so difficult to
determine whether the conditions for presumed consent have been met.200 Thus,
actual practice, despite officially differing opt-in and opt-out policies, may not differ
as much as is thought. Ultimately, there appears to be a deep-seated feeling by many
medical professionals in Western democracies that decisions about the body must be
made by the individual or his or her next of kin and not society.201 Whether one
system, “opt-in” or “opt-out,” has higher recovery rates is difficult to say because
there is no consistent and reliable way in effect today to measure organ donation
across cultures due to the absence of consistent methods and definitions.202
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many of Florida’s blind citizens” through increasing supply. See, e.g., Florida v. Powell, 497
So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1996). But see Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir.
1991) (ruling that the next of kin had a constitutionally protected property right in the
deceased member’s body).
199

ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 207.

200

Jensen, supra note 93, at 563-64.

201

ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 208, 217.

202

While opt-out countries appear to have higher donation rates, Id. at 212-13, because the
United States rates are already quite high, a change to an opt-out system would not likely have

2007-08]

REDEFINING STEWARDSHIP OVER BODY PARTS

105

In the United States, given our non-communitarian health system and the fact that
approximately 47 million Americans have no form of health insurance203 and many
with insurance are still underinsured, there are significant fairness and equity
concerns with an opt-out policy. If a person cannot afford a transplant, she will not
get one even if she needs one. However, if she dies under the right circumstances,
her organs could be taken and used to benefit those who can afford a transplant.
Such inequities impose almost insurmountable justice and fairness concerns with an
opt-out policy under our current health care system.204
F. Other Proposals
Not surprisingly, there are numerous proposals for addressing body parts,
particularly organs. As to organs, aside from the proposals already reviewed, some
recommend futures markets or encouraging more donations through quid pro quo
donation schemes, such as awarding preference or priority on waiting lists for an
organ if one has previously indicated a willingness to donate.205 Other proposals
include granting estate tax deductions and the like. As to tissue and DNA, there are
recommendations for creating biobanks that not only control the samples but also
return the benefits to the whole of society in some fashion. Ultimately, each of these
many proposals rests on an underlying assumption that the body is a type of
individual property or that it is something that is not property but more communally
based. The absence of a consensus on how we should treat the body makes these
proposals harder to implement.
IV. CASE LAW
Legally, we approach different subject matters through laws passed by either our
federal government or state legislatures, regulations implemented and administered
under agencies’ legislative authority, or judge-made case law (the common law).
Both the national and state legislatures have been reluctant to tackle the complex
problem of how the body should be treated, with the exception of outlawing the sale
of organs while permitting donations of organs and tissue. Thus, they have left the
problems to be resolved by the courts. But, currently, there is no consensus in the
courts over how to treat bodies. As a result, the law in this country has still not

a significant impact and could have negative impacts. Id. at 27, 212-13. For example, in
Brazil, when the country implemented an opt-out policy, eighty-three percent of one city’s
population registered refusals and objections because of inequalities in society and distrust of
the government. Ultimately, the country had to change the law to bring it in line with its
citizens’ expectations and require familial authorization. Jensen, supra note 93, at 562. In the
United States general mistrust of the system, inequities within society, and fear that death
might be hastened or one might not receive the best care could, for example, cause many optouts from families that might otherwise donate. ORGAN DONATION, supra note 1, at 215.
203
N.C. Aizenman and Christopher Lee, U.S. Poverty Rate Drops; Ranks of Uninsured
Grow, WASH POST, Aug. 29, 2007, at A3.
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answered the “deceptively simple question: Do we own our bodies?”206 Instead,
“[t]he law of the body [remains] in a state of confusion and chaos.”207 “Sometimes
the body is characterized as property, sometimes it is classified as quasi-property,
and sometimes it is not conceived as property at all, but rather as the subject of
privacy rights.”208
There exists no clear set of legal rules regarding bodies and their parts.209 As to
dead bodies, the issue of how to treat them has long been debated by legal
commentators, and the case law is without definitive resolution. The seventeenth
century British Scholar Lord Edward Coke opined that cadavers should be the
property of no one based on his belief that the word cadaver was derived from the
word caro data ermibus, meaning flesh given to works.210 His pronouncement on
the meaning of cadaver influenced several hundred years of Anglo-American
common law and prevented the body from being treated by the law as a type of
property until the mid-Nineteenth Century.
In 1856, Samuel Ruggles in a New York legal case set forth another etymological
root of cadaver, cadare, meaning to fall.211 This new Latin scholarship, combined
with evolving black markets for bodies during the nineteenth century as medical
schools began to study anatomy and created a market for cadavers, led some
American courts to recognize a right to possession of a body for burial, which they
recognized as a property right of sorts.212 Eventually, recognizing that property
might not be the best description of the right to a corpse for burial, some courts in the
United States articulated a hybrid term they called quasi-property which gave
families and friends a right to claim a corpse to effect a burial, but not for any other
reason; whereas, other courts continued to adhere to a “no property” common law
rule.213 As property law is state law and differs among the states, American
jurisdictions are today divided between the “no property” jurisdictions and the
“quasi-property” jurisdictions, with each side claiming a majority.214
Quasi-property states allow next of kin a “right” for burial purposes. They liken
it to a “sacred trust” based on the reasons of “natural sentiment, affection, and
206

R. Alta Charo, Body of Research–Ownership and Use of Human Tissue, 355(15) NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1517, 1157 (2006).
207
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reverence.”215 Courts find a duty by family members to tend to the bodies of their
next of kin, arising from these sentiments and our common humanity. This duty
gives rise to a right in the corpse that is not a property right but more akin to a sacred
trust. It is not a traditional property right because the family members do not own
the body but merely hold the right as a sacred trust for the benefit of all family and
friends who have an interest.216 A Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision suggests
that the distinctions drawn between U.S. jurisdictions is more a matter of rhetoric
than substantive rights because, to the extent it is a property right, it is one that
resides in a trust and arises out of a duty.217 Other courts state instead that it is a
legal fiction created to enable relatives to recover for the tort of mental distress.218
Recent cases addressing the removal of corneas and tissue from dead bodies
illustrate the division and confusion within the courts over how to treat body parts
from corpses. The Florida Supreme Court, for example, expressly ruled that there is
no constitutionally protected interest by family members in dead bodies, thereby
validating a Florida Statute permitting the recovery of corneas without family
permission from bodies under the Coroner’s purview.219 The Court rejected the
family’s due process (privacy right) and takings (property right) claims.220
While other courts reached the same conclusion as the Florida court,221 many,
however, articulate contrary positions. With respect to the same subject matter,
some courts find a property right. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, interpreting Ohio state law, ruled that next of kin have a constitutionally
protected right in a deceased family member’s body.222 Applying Michigan law, the
Sixth Circuit also found a right in a next of kin’s dead body that it reasoned is closely
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Rao, supra note 3.

216

Rao, supra note 3, at 384-85 (citing Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227
(R.I.1872)).
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Id. (citing Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904)).
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Id. at 384-86 (citing Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E. 2d 430 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1986) (holding real basis for damages is mental anguish); Culpepper v. Pearl St.
Building, 877 P.2d 877 (Colo. 1994) (quasi-property does not protect a true ownership interest
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Florida v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1191-93 (Fla. 1996) (holding that the Florida statute
allowing the medical examiner to extract corneas from decedents during autopsies does not
constitute a taking of relatives’ private property because the next of kin possesses no property
right in the body).
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state quasi-property interest protected under tort law); Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v.
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analogous to property’s bundle of rights.223 A Missouri federal district court judge
reasoned, in a case where parents disputed the use of their dead son’s organs for
transplant, that both parents held a constitutional property interest (not a liberty or
privacy interest) in the dead son’s body.224 But despite finding a property interest,
the court proceeded to apply an analysis which found that, when the property interest
was balanced against the state’s weighty interest in providing organs to the living,
the property interest in the body did not prevail, and the organs could be
recovered.225
To date, looking at the often conflicting court opinions, the courts are treating
each case individually without creating enduring principles to be applied in cases
addressing bodies but, rather, relying on whatever principles they can conjure up to
arrive at a fair outcome for the parties immediately before them. This results in, as
demonstrated by the cornea cases, disparate outcomes despite similar circumstances–
something our justice system seeks to avoid in the name of fairness and justice.226
As to body parts removed from living individuals for research purposes, there is
also no definitive statement. The seminal case in this area is Moore v. Regents of the
University of California.227 The Moore decision is one of the first and only cases to
directly address ownership over tissues used for human research, and it illustrates the
wide differences of opinion.228 John Moore discovered after years of treatment at the
University of California, Los Angeles Medical Center for leukemia that his cells had
been used by his doctors to develop an extremely profitable cell line for research
purposes.229 His unique condition made his cells and the resulting cell line extremely
valuable. Moore, however, had never been told that his cells were being collected
and used to develop a potential product that would be sold and from which
biotechnology companies would reap large sums.230
After learning that his cells had been turned into a valuable cell line, he filed a
lawsuit arguing that he owned his body parts and that his property rights had been
stolen and his rights violated.231 The lower court emphatically ruled that Moore had

223
Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975
(1995). See also Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2002)
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has property rights in the body of a deceased relative, then body parts cannot be removed
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prohibit payment for medical tissue for research. Non-payment is the norm but not required
by law. Rao argues that NOTA’s prohibition of the sale of organs paradoxically portrays the
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a property right in his tissue, reasoning that not awarding him that right and the
concomitant control over his tissue it entailed would result in an “invasion of human
privacy and dignity in the name of medical progress.”232 Moreover, the lower court
focused on the unequal bargaining power of an individual in need of medical
treatment with his doctor and reasoned that imbalance of power only heightened the
invasion of the individual’s privacy.233
In stark contrast, the California Supreme Court reversed the lower court over a
vigorous dissent. The Moore majority concluded that societal interests in new
medical products trumped individuals’ interests of financial benefit from their own
tissue.234
The Moore court ruling is somewhat complicated by the nuances of John
Moore’s particular legal claims. His primary claim argued strict tort liability under a
theory of “conversion.” If the court granted his strict liability claim, this would
mean that every party in the possession chain, including those researchers down the
line who had no knowledge nor responsibility for the deception, would be liable in
tort. Thus, liability would attach to every person or entity that had come into
possession of the cells regardless of their knowledge of the cell’s origins. The
California court expressed grave concerns that requiring scientific researchers to do
extensive research and investigation regarding the consensual pedigree of their raw
materials would likely stifle the, at that time, emerging bio-technology industry,
which held, and still holds, great promise for treatments to aid all of society.235
In addition to valuing the advancement of public health and the biotechnology
industry over individuals’ private rights in tissue, the majority reasoned that research
participants do not merit property rights in the inventions because they perform no
innovative or creative work. Finally, they reasoned that commodification of the
human body is immoral, unethical, and contrary to our society’s values. Moreover,
the court reasoned that Moore’s appropriate remedy was for a breach of fiduciary
duty and informed consent and did not, therefore, lie in property law. They reasoned
that the fiduciary duties owed by a doctor to a patient, properly applied, adequately
protect the plaintiff’s interests. Finally, the court expressly looked to the legislature
to solve the problem stating, “if the scientific users of human cells are to be held
liable for failing to investigate the consensual pedigree of their raw materials, we
believe the Legislature should make that decision.”236 But neither the California
legislature nor any other state legislature has passed legislation invalidating the
theory in Moore that there is no property interest in the body.
human body as an article of commerce that lies within the purview of Congressional power
and would otherwise be subject to sale on the market. Rao, supra note 3.
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The California court’s reliance on a doctor’s fiduciary duty to her patient as
adequately protecting John Moore’s interests proved to be incorrect. Fiduciary law,
as currently applied in health care, only applies to the relationship between the
patient and his or her doctor. It does not cover any of the relationships down the
chain with researchers, hospitals, or corporations who may eventually profit from an
individual’s raw materials. Moreover, Arato v. Avedon,237decided three years after
Moore, took such a narrow view of a doctor’s duty of informed consent for research
that research participants are in fact left without much in the way of remedies if
something other than their medical interests, such as their dignity or autonomy, is
impacted by unethical research methodologies.238
Only a few cases following Moore directly address these issues. Most recently,
in Washington University v. Catalona,239 a dispute arose when a research doctor left
his position at Washington University and took a position at a new institution. Dr.
Catalona sought to take with him the biological materials he had collected from his
patients for the purpose of continuing his prostate cancer research.240 He argued that
the materials belonged to his patients and that because many of them had signed a
second consent form drafted by him directing that he be allowed to take the materials
with him to his new institution, Washington University no longer had a legal interest
in the materials.241 Washington University argued, in contrast, that because it had
“developed, paid for, and maintained a substantial repository of tissue and serum
samples for prostate cancer research . . .”242 and that because the initial consent forms
were made out in the name of Washington University, not Dr. Catalona personally,
the University owned the tissue samples.
The court sided with the University, finding that once the patients signed an
informed consent form donating their tissue, blood, DNA, or other biological
materials for research purposes to the University, they surrendered all rights of
ownership to direct the use and transfer of the materials.243 They could not come
back later and direct a new use or ownership.
The court’s opinion is ambiguous as to whether the patients ever had a property
interest in their bodies. Under one reading, they potentially had such an interest, but
lost it when they donated the tissue for research. Under another reading, they never
had such an interest.244 What is clear is that the court in Catalona equated
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Washington University’s possession and control over the research samples with
ownership under state law and concluded that the University owned and controlled
the removed samples.245 Under the Catalona decision, once a patient donates
materials for research, regardless of what relationship or legal interest the individual
had with those materials prior to donation; they become an object, similar to
equipment, brick and mortar, or intellectual property, in which title (ownership) vests
with the institution conducting the research.246
In reaching its conclusion, the Catalona court relied on both the Moore case and
one subsequent case, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Research Institute.247 In
Greenberg, discussed supra in Section III.B., families with a rare genetic disorder
believed they had an agreement with a group of researchers that, in return for their
donation of tissue and other samples with genetic materials, the researchers would
develop a genetic test that would be made widely available on the families’ terms.248
The hospital and research institutions, however, gained a patent over the genetic test
and disagreements arose between the patent holders and the families as to the manner
in which the tests would be made broadly available and affordable.249 The families
sued, claiming, inter alia, that their property had been unjustly used to enrich the
researchers’ hospital and alleging conversion of property. The lower court, citing
Moore, reasoned that the families had no property rights in their tissue and DNA.
As a result of the Greenberg case, as discussed in Section III.B., savvy patient
groups are now bargaining in advance with researchers over the rights to the
products and tools created with their tissues or genetic material.250 Whether a court
would strike down these private contractual negotiations as against public policy
under Moore is simply unknown.
Organs and tissue are not the only body parts that have been addressed by courts.
U.S. courts have taken somewhat varying positions with respect to body parts that
are easily reproduced and separated, such as blood, sperm, and hair. In one case, a
court likened blood to a tangible product akin to “eggs, milk and honey,” clearly
treating it as property and an object once separated from the body.251 Similarly, in

whether this prohibition includes property interests. A 1996 guidance document from the
OPRR stated that waiver of property rights in tissue or fluid would violate this ban. Mark
Barnes et al., Wash. Univ. v. Catalona: Ownership and Use of Biological Materials Collected
for Research, 5 MEDICAL RESEARCH LAW & POL’Y REP. 336-39 (May 3, 2006) (available at
http://www.bna.com/) (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). But a subsequent 1989 letter from the
director of the compliance division reached the opposite conclusion. Id. The Catalona court
found these agency pronouncements to be mere opinions and not legally binding. Id. (citing
Catalona at 20).
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Hecht v. Superior Court,252 the court allowed sperm to be bequeathed by will,
essentially treating the sperm as property.253
Frozen embryos, on the other hand, have caused the courts some angst. In Davis
v. Davis,254 the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to treat an embryo as property.
The court reasoned that the embryo was neither a person nor property but rather
some sort of in-between category which required it to balance the various privacy
interests at stake. In Kass v. Kass,255 New York’s highest court, in contrast to the
Tennessee court, refused to apply privacy rights to a similar frozen embryo dispute.
The court there reasoned that the embryo was not a person for constitutional
purposes. Instead, the court treated the dispute over who controlled the embryo as
one of dispositional authority to be determined by enforcement of prior contracts and
agreements. The New York court’s treatment of the embryo as the subject of a
contract is compatible with a property treatment, but the court did not specifically
endorse a property approach.256
Recently, in California’s field of regenerative medicine, new funding regulations
“require researchers to honor the limits set by donors of embryos or gametes on the
kinds of work that can be done even with donated tissue that has been
‘anonymized’—a rule consistent with a theory of property rights in tissue.”257 But as
explained in Section VII, it does not necessarily entail a property rights regime. This
regulation would also be consistent with the framework set forth in Section VII of
this paper.
V. REFRAMING THE DEBATE
Ultimately, how we view and understand ourselves is at stake. Many of our core
values overlie the questions and answers we ask about how we treat our body parts.
Most fundamentally, our autonomy, dignity, human liberty, and self-determination
are at issue, but balanced against these are our sense of ourselves as part of a larger
community and our concomitant duties to help others. Superimposed on these issues
are existing and quickly evolving markets and technologies and the great promises
they hold for us. The questions are complex and hard to answer. Yet, given our
nature as conscious beings with ethical sensibilities, we are compelled to ask
questions and to attempt to develop some answers. Moreover, we need a consistent
framework within which to ask and answer these questions. This is necessary not
just to satisfy our sense of fairness and justice but also to give evolving industries
and markets more certainty with which to plan and work.
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In asking these questions, we must also ask what is it we need the courts and/or
legislatures to do regarding the treatment of our bodies. Should we seek uniform
principles to be applied to these cases and the quickly evolving markets in tissue and
body parts, so their treatment is clear? Or should we continue to address them on an
ad hoc basis state-by-state, court-by-court, attempting to apply old bodies of law,
such as property or privacy, as best we can?
Most parties involved would welcome some guidance, yet the consequences of
selecting differing sets of principles are significant.
For example, if
ownership/property is selected, a multitude of questions will arise including the
question whether individuals can sell their organs and body parts? Property does not
necessarily require such treatment; we can allow ownership, but forbid sales. But
ownership does entail “objectness” and “thingness” and most of us associate with it a
right to sell things or, if not sell, at least dispose of things we own as we wish. Yet
we do not allow individuals to give away essential organs, even if they so desire,
because it would sanction suicide. On the other hand, a trusteeship model might
imply that our bodies are held in common and that there is a communal right to our
organs after we die,258 violating some people’s sense of autonomy and control over
their bodies. A privacy based model would create rights of action that do not
currently exist. Such consequences explain, in part, why our legal system still has
not answered the question “do we own our bodies?”259 Moreover, there is simply
confusion as so many different concepts appear to apply in part but not in full.
Moreover, we have strong and visceral reactions that we do not entirely
understand or explore regarding the treatment of bodies and their parts. Our
relationship with our bodies is complicated and laden with many different religious
and societal beliefs. Science is learning more and more about how our minds are
intimately connected with our bodies, and how our physical bodies create
consciousness and even our sense of ethics and of being individuals. Yet, despite
these connections or this connectedness, we know through our experience that we
can distance ourselves from our bodies–to be what yogis call “an observer” of our
thoughts, our minds, our bodies, and our feelings; we are both them and can observe
them simultaneously. Being the observer does not entail objectifying our bodies
necessarily, but we are certainly capable of that as well. We can view our bodies as
things to be adorned, sculpted, manipulated, and transformed, and we can objectify
ourselves and others. Yet our experience of the body “is simultaneously a perception
of subjectivity and objectivity,” but we can also transcend our bodies and relate to
ourselves as mere things. Our minds are quite powerful in making distinctions and
thrive on creating meaning from difference. But there is a very real fear that doing
this with body parts threatens the ambiguity we experience between our subjective
and objective selves and turns the experience of the body into a “mere object in a
world among other things.”260
A successful legal conception of our bodies must both recognize its “object”
qualities and its “subject” qualities. Property, despite all of its malleability, cannot
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accomplish this task, or at a minimum, it is not well suited to accomplishing this
task, as property is inherently an object devoid of subjectivity.261
Any treatment of the body must recognize that we relate to the world through our
bodies. And our bodies are an inevitable measuring stick through which we
understand and experience everything. As neurologist Damasio explains:
[T]he body as represented in the brain, may constitute the indispensable
frame of reference for the neural processes that we experience as the
mind; that our very organism rather than some absolute external reality is
used as the ground reference for the constructions we make of the world
around us and for the construction of the ever-present sense of subjectivity
that is part and parcel of our experiences; that our most refined thoughts
and best actions, our greatest joys and deepest sorrows, use the body as a
yardstick.262
In a very important sense, objections to treating the body as property stem from
these concepts. Our bodies are the source of all we feel and think. Everything we
experience is related or processed through our bodies. They are the root of our
existence. Treating them as pure objects is repugnant because it lessens the essence
of this miracle we experience as life. Any treatment of bodies must incorporate the
dignity and sanctity of the body as the source of all we experience.
In addition to accomplishing this most difficult task, any set of legal principles
for the body must encompass a sense of autonomy, liberty, and integrity, as well as a
sense of altruism, reciprocity, relatedness, and moral obligations and duties. Yet, as
discussed, differing frameworks emphasize different values, and it is difficult to
come up with one that can accommodate these all too often competing values and
concepts.
Property both aids and detracts from these values. Property aids the sense of
autonomy in that it typically entails control–the right to possess, use, and exclude
others, as well as to direct the disposition of. These are core elements of the bundle
of sticks included in the property concept. Property also disaggregates and creates a
conceptual system for allocating rights and responsibilities towards a resource.263
Yet property also encompasses a dualism, which is not consistent necessarily with
our understanding of ourselves. Property implies something separate doing the
owning that is distinct from the object owned.264
This separateness and
objectification, stemming from a dualistic view of the person as separate from the
body, is not threatening when the essence of human life is not at stake.265 While it
allows us to create value in our markets and is a crucial tool in our arsenal for
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valuing and trading resources,266 at the same time, this attribute is property’s
failing.267
Some scholars (e.g., Rao) frame the debate as necessitating a choice between a
property or privacy paradigm. Privacy is strongly related to property, as both create
boundaries and protect individual autonomy. Both are full of metaphors and
language describing boundaries that protect the individual. The appeal in these
concepts, thus, stems from, among other things, the sense of a boundary, as our
bodies constitute one of the most significant boundaries we experience between us
and the world.
Yet, for important reasons, the concepts of privacy and property are also quite
distinct. Whereas property creates the dualism and objectification described above,
privacy envisions something that is indivisible and inextricably intertwined.268
Property is a positive entitlement,269 endowing the individual with rights and power
against others. Privacy, on the other hand, is a negative entitlement; it does not
empower but, rather, circumscribes interference with personal and spiritual activities.
Property protects market relationships; whereas, privacy protects personal spheres
and relationships. Privacy interests cannot be sold, separated, confiscated, or
contracted away, but they can be balanced against competing interests. Privacy
interests cannot be disaggregated or objectified. Privacy interests also end at
death.270
Privacy thus aligns itself well with non-commoditization and integrity of the
individual and body. It also connotes control, although not absolute, as it can be
balanced against other interests. It is, in effect, a legal characterization of the body,
not so much as body but rather as a refuge from the state and others’ competing
rights or demands.271
Both concepts include and support autonomy values and are important in creating
our sense of liberty, as well as in defining our relationships to the state.
Consequently, we tend to lean on them when we are uncertain. They are comforting
when we are in unfamiliar territory regarding the conflicts that arise regarding the
body and its parts. Yet these new dilemmas call for a new conceptualization that can
both continue to protect autonomy and liberty but also address our relatedness.
Instead of looking to one particular area of the law, we should ask how we can
construct a body of the law to address body parts. Given the broad array of differing
issues to be addressed and the law of unintended consequences, a broad array of
responses will likely be necessary, and any scheme must present broad principles not
narrow rules. Yet the principles must be sufficient to guide analysis and outcomes to
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the best and most just result. What is needed is a new law of the body. Just as we
have, for example, labor law to govern our working relationships, we need a law to
govern our bodies and their constituent parts. Such a system works best if it is an
amalgamation of legislation and judge-made law.
Ultimately, given the principles upon which our society is founded, we must
establish certain values that most of us can agree upon regarding our bodies.272
Those values are autonomy (control) over our destinies (liberty) and, hence, some
degree of control over what sorts of uses are made over our body parts once they are
separated from us. Dignity in the treatment of body parts is also important. As to
relationships and duties, a communal right and duty regarding our bodies is simply
not part of our current culture or legal vocabulary. It is hard to impose a duty where
there is no coupled right.
Yet there is still a need to recognize our
interconnectedness as a community. Moreover, something must govern the
relationship between the donor and the entity that receives any parts, whether it is an
organ or tissue after death or tissue donated during a medical procedure for research.
Autonomy itself can be seen as imposing some sort of duties upon those who work
with, receive, or benefit from body parts.
Stewardship often is cited as an alternative paradigm. Stewardship is not a legal
paradigm in and of itself,273 as there are few laws directly addressing stewardship.
Although, in a broad sense, the law of trusts, agency, and other bodies of law that
encompass fiduciary duties include elements of the concept of stewardship,
stewardship, as commonly understood, entails taking care of something. While one
can own that which one is the steward over, ownership is not central to the concept.
Rather, responsible management is the controlling element. It connotes a
relationship in which there is a duty to manage in a responsible manner. As to
natural resources, for example, stewardship entails managing them so as not to
deplete them but rather to use them so that value is maximized for current and future
generations.
Stewardship, unlike property and privacy, can encompass subjects at both ends of
a relationship or an object or thing at one end. It does not necessarily imply
objecthood without subjectivity, which property implicitly creates, nor does it
require a subject at both ends, as privacy does. Dignity can be read into stewardship
because the duty to manage or use responsibly can promote the thing managed as
being entitled to respect and dignity, whether it is a mere object or something else.
Stewardship can also satisfy many justice concerns. Objections to the courts’
solution in Greenberg and Moore arise because individuals received no benefit from
272
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products created from their donations; whereas, doctors and biotechnology
companies reaped profits. Courts are concerned, however, with logistically giving
patients control over their samples once donated, and rightly so. Giving them total
control over their samples would create a logistical nightmare and make research
extremely difficult, thus stifling new discoveries. Stewardship could impose duties
on the doctors and companies to use the products in a responsible manner and to use
them only in a manner consistent with certain principles. It might also impose a
responsibility to give back to the broader community, thus meeting justice concerns.
But it would not necessarily give the original donor the power to disrupt the research
and directly control the disposition of a research sample.
What stewardship does not provide, however, is concrete rules. It is merely an
ethical precept, not a body of law. Moreover, the liberty values of control and
autonomy, which must be central to any body of law regarding the body and its parts,
are not part of the concept of stewardship.
Is there a body of law that meets all of these concerns? Agency law offers a
possibility.
VI. DEFINING STEWARDSHIP TO INCLUDE FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO SOCIETY AND
DONORS THROUGH AGENCY PRINCIPLES
Fiduciary duties owed today contain some elements of stewardship but are
insufficient to protect individuals’ dignity and autonomy.274 Is there a way to expand
the concept of fiduciary duty with broader principles so as to protect dignity and
autonomy? What would a new duty or expanded fiduciary duty look like? The
concept of duty and obligation, generally, is missing in great part from much of
contemporary American society, which is more focused on rights. Duties tend to be
associated in our minds with antiquated concepts that have roots in the past and past
cultures (e.g., duties in feudalism to a liege lord). If rooted to old modes of being,
duty may not be particularly useful to us in formulating a solution. But there are
places where duty can come into play in contemporary life. Duty is really part and
parcel of the concept of stewardship. It is this sense of duty that separates
stewardship from the concept of ownership, which predominantly entails positive
rights without concomitant duties.
Agency law is, in part, a law of duties.275 Historically, it derives from the law of
master and servant.276 In essence, it sets forth principles to govern a relationship.277
As such, it is a good fit for defining stewardship because it defines the rights and
duties within the relationship and also sets forth the mechanisms for redress if duties
are violated.278 Additionally, agency law incorporates within the relationship aspects
274
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of control and consent; the relationship must be a “consensual” one, thus respecting
the parties’ autonomy and dignity.279
Typically there are three categories of parties involved in an agency relationship:
(1) a principal, (2) an agent, and (3) affected third parties.280 Essentially, agency law
sets forth a variety of fiduciary duties that an agent owes to a principal and that a
principal also owes to an agent. It typically is envisioned as “encompass[ing] the
legal consequences of consensual relationships in which one person (“the principal”)
manifests assent that another person (the “agent”) shall, subject to the principal’s
right to control, have power to affect the principal’s legal relationship through the
agent’s acts and on the principal’s behalf.”281
Within the broad confines of agency law there are “true” agency relationships
that must meet the strict requirements of agency, but there are also what the
Restatement (Third) of Agency refers to as “untrue” agency relationships that do not
meet all of these prerequisites but are still governed by many of the same principles.
Essential to a “true” agency relationship are certain requisite elements of control,
including (1) an ability by the principal to terminate the relationship at any point and
(2) an ability by the principal to change instructions through interim directions to an
agent.282 Traditionally, “many people understand the law of agency . . . to appl[y] to
situations in which one person has, or appears to have, the right to enter into
contracts with third parties that bind a principal or in which a person has the right to
make dispositions of another person’s property.”283 If one were to hypothesize that a
donor or patient were the principal and anyone receiving a body part were an agent,
agency law would not be a good fit. The control aspect would create far too many
problems to be accommodated in any realistic fashion.
But, importantly, for our purposes, the reach of agency relationships is broader
than the traditional understanding of this strict form of true agency.284 Agency
278
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embraces a “broader set of relationships than might be expected” and, thus, intersects
with many different bodies of law, for example, torts, restitution, and employment
law.285 While all employees of a business are not necessarily true agents because
they cannot make binding contractual rights or liabilities on behalf of their
employers, the law of agency is still relevant because it “defines duties the employer
and employee owe to each other, and it defines circumstances under which the
employer is vicariously liable for wrongs committed by an employee.”286
Another example of an “untrue” agency relationship would be a durable power of
attorney. This is an agency relationship created initially by a principal consenting to
someone to act as his or her agent in the future. Yet the actual agency relationship,
in this instance, is only triggered by the principal’s loss of mental competence, at
which point the principal is unable to terminate the relationship or to provide interim
instructions.287 The control requisite to a “true” agency relationship is not present.
Yet the agent has a duty to adhere to the initial set of instructions and other fiduciary
duties.
The duties of an agent, true or untrue, generally are those of a fiduciary: general
duties of care, competence, and diligence; a duty of good conduct; a duty to provide
information regarding that being taken care of; and a duty of record keeping and
accounting.288 In addition to these duties, which one could imagine easily mapping
onto the treatment of body parts, there are also other duties: that any benefits flow to
the principal and not to the agent; that there be no commingling of properties of the
agent with the principal’s assets; and that the principal is always in control and can
terminate the relationship. Plainly, this latter set of principles is inappropriate for
any body parts regime. Continuing control is impractical in almost all contexts. The
donor is either dead and the parts are now part of someone else and control is now in
their purview, or it would stifle research and development of new products to allow
such control. The duty regarding no commingling of assets is also impractical in
almost every context. Furthermore, benefits do not only flow to the original donor
(in this analogy the principal); rather, benefits may flow to all involved: recipients,
corporations, and society as a whole.
Thus, while a strict and true agency relationship cannot be directly mapped onto
the body, how we treat our body parts, once separated from the body, can be
addressed by aspects of agency law. We can isolate those aspects of this old body of
law and expand upon them to meet the needs addressed in Section V. Agency law
can apply in a way akin to its application to durable powers of attorney. At the time
the power of attorney is created, there is a principal and an agent. In the context of
body parts, initially, as the donation or separation of the body part is occurring, there
could exist something more akin to an agency relationship.
After separation from the body occurs, the relationship is more “trust like”
because there is no true agency relationship, yet the agent has a duty to follow the
285
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initial guidelines set forth by the principal. What exactly might this entail? First,
consent is essential to the relationship, and under our current regime, typically some
form of consent is required. But an agency relationship implies more than just
consent; an element of control is also a prerequisite. While it would be impractical
in all instances (e.g., organ donation) to allow each principal or family to set forth
detailed guidelines and instructions, it is, however, not impractical to imagine a set
of principles generally applicable to all donations of tissue and organs that would be
disclosed to the principal, as well as a range of options to choose from as to future
uses. The range would be something like the range of options offered to a financial
donor to a university or school. The donor can restrict his or her donation to certain
purposes (e.g., athletics or musical programs only). As long as the funds are used
responsibly within these circumscribed categories, they meet the terms of the initial
donation. Likewise, people could circumscribe the future uses of their body parts.
Of course, there are limits on the ability to designate uses. One cannot designate,
generally, when donating to a scholarship fund, for example, that no lesbian or
African-American be given a scholarship. Likewise, someone cannot prohibit the
tissue from going to specific groups of people. Instead, only certain types of uses
and limitations could be allowed. But, in this way, some limited form of control and
autonomy is given to the individual or his or her family. Moreover, by disclosing
certain uses (and this would be a very limited, but broad, universe of categories),
there is much fuller disclosure and openness about what may occur in the future to
the body part, making the entire process more sincere and open.
Finally, an ultimate accounting is required by agency law, which should also be
required by stewardship. While the accounting may not necessarily be required to
each individual, an annual report by each organization using body parts is not out of
the question: something available for public inspection and widely disseminated
explaining the ultimate uses, profits and losses, and return to society in a way for all
to see. Such an accounting entails something different than what is typically present
in an annual report, such as balance sheets explaining revenues and expenses.
Instead, it requires an accounting of the uses of the body parts and the ultimate
benefits received from those uses.
In order for the stewardship concept to be meaningful, any recipient organization
of body parts would owe specific duties to society or to donors and their families.
Adding both (1) an element of control over future uses of body parts and (2)
requiring an accounting introduces elements of an agency relationship. Stewardship
as an ethical concept could be structured to incorporate these principles of agency
law and more broadly fiduciary law as not only the right thing to do but also a
socially expected requirement or a legal duty.
Finally, neither stewardship nor these agency principles rule out payment or inkind compensation for body parts. Monetary compensation or in-kind compensation
(e.g., funeral expenses), if provided in this context, do not necessarily raise the fears
expressed by those opposing an ownership/property designation. As Radin argues,
the real concern is that compensation is the beginning of a slippery slope, ultimately
permitting social oppression such as turning the subject (i.e., the person) into an
object.289 Compensation, however, can exist within frameworks other than
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property.290 An understanding more akin to how we compensate for services, for
example, does not necessarily lead to the feared social oppression. If compensation
is given, but it is given within a context of shared relationships and duties that are
clearly enunciated instead of simply a market exchange, we can avoid the slippery
slope to social oppression.
VII. CONCLUSION
“When systems fail, alternatives must be sought.”291 Ultimately neither courts
nor the legislatures are likely to resolve the confusion surrounding the treatment of
human body parts. The place for answers and a resolution is most likely to stem
from our practices, our customs, and the discourse we use in addressing our
treatment of human body parts. A new understanding in this context will then
naturally filter through to the courts and legislatures as necessary.
Stewardship, if re-defined to incorporate familiar duties, rights, and
relationships offers one possible framework. Turning to stewardship, however,
requires much work to flesh out the concept and give its framework significant
substance. One possible avenue for developing concrete guidelines and new
institutions to support the ethical concept of stewardship are those defined above:
requiring certain specific duties, including some element of initial designation about
future uses within narrow limits, and an ultimate accounting to society of the
treatment and uses made. By no means is this the only path, but it is useful because
it can accommodate a wide range of values, including a limited, but still viable,
autonomy and, simultaneously, a sense of relatedness through mutual obligations.
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